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INTRODUCTION
On March 31, 2004, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ" or "World
Court") issued its ruling in Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. US.).'
The World Court held that various states within the United States had violated
the rights of fifty-one Mexican nationals. The states had failed to notify the
Mexican citizens of their rights, under the Vienna Convention on Consular
2Relations, to contact Mexican consulates. By unanimous vote, the World
Court then required that the United States "shall provide, by means of its own
choosing, review and reconsideration of the conviction[s] and sentence[s]" at
issue.3 Mexico, in turn, indicated that it expected the United States to abide by
the World Court decision.4
The Avena decision was not well received in Texas. The state, which
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1. 2004 I.C.J. 1 (Mar. 31).
2. Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter "Vienna Convention"].
3. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 61.
4. Cragg Hines, A Sound Decision Vs. the Likely Upshot, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 1, 2004, at A28
(.'Of course we have full confidence that the United States will comply with the court's ruling,' Arturo
Dajer, a legal adviser in Mexico's foreign ministry told a news conference in Mexico City .... ).
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 23:455, 2005
sentenced sixteen of the Mexican nationals affected by the ruling, has a long
and complex relationship with the death penalty. Immediately following the
ruling, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott indicated that he would seek an
interpretation from the U.S. Department of State in an effort to guide his own
and Texas's actions with respect to the decision.5 General Abbott indicated
that, absent recommendations from the federal government, his office had no
plans to ask for new trials, new sentencing, or stays of execution.6 Going
further, a spokesman for Texas Governor Rick Perry stated, "Obviously the
governor respects the world court's right to have an opinion, but the fact
remains they have no standing and no jurisdiction in the state of Texas."
7
Similarly, Paco Felici, a spokesman for the Texas Attorney General, boldly
proclaimed, "We do not believe the World Court has jurisdiction in these
matters."
8
On February 28, 2005, the Bush Administration announced that it would
instruct state courts to provide new hearings to the Mexican nationals whose
cases were addressed in Avena.9  Texas officials, however, remained
intransigent. The office of Attorney General Abbott released a statement
challenging the Administration: "We respectfully believe the executive
determination exceeds the constitutional bounds for federal authority."
'10
This Article focuses on the reaction of Texas state officials for several
reasons. First, the authors are born Texans and law professors and legislators in
5. Dane Schiller & Maro Robbins, Mexico Wins in World Court, SAN ANTONIO EXPREss-NEWS,
Apr. 1, 2004, at IA.
6. Id. On June 30, 2004, we requested an update from the U.S. Department of State regarding the
status of Texas's request for an interpretation and/or guidance from the Department of State. See Letter
from Reynaldo Anaya Valencia to Peter Mason, June 30, 2004 (on file with author). By letter dated July
6, 2004, the Department of State informed the authors that as of that date, Texas had yet to make a
formal request for an interpretation and/or guidance on the Avena decision. See Letter from Peter Mason
to Reynaldo Anaya Valencia, July 6, 2004 (on file with author) ("With regard to communications
between Texas government officials and the State Department, there have been a number of discussions
between Texas and State Department officials both before and since the International Court of Justice
issued its judgment in Avena. The State Department initiated some of these discussions and others were
initiated by Texas. We continue to discuss the judgment with a variety of Texas official in an informal
basis." (emphasis added)).
7. Polly Ross Hughes, U.S. Told To Review Cases of Mexicans Sentenced to Death; Texas
Unmoved by World Court Ruling, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 1, 2004, at AI (quoting spokesman Robert
Black).
8. Schiller & Robbins, supra note 5; see also Hines, supra note 4 (quoting Mr. Felici as saying:
"We don't believe the world court has standing. Our business is conducted in the state courts and federal
U.S. courts.").
9. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 38-48, Medellin v.
Dretke, cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (No. 04-5928). In a Memorandum for the Attomey General,
President Bush stated, "[T]he United States will discharge its international obligation under the decision
of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals ... by
having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases
filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision." Id. app. 2.
10. White House Enters Death Penalty Flap; Administration Wants State Courts To Intervene for
Mexicans Facing Execution, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Mar. 9, 2005, at 3A (quoting statement of
Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott).
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that state and want to see their beloved home state depicted in a more favorable
light. Second, the death penalty has a particularly significant history in Texas,
and the state has one of the highest execution rates in the world. Third, Texas
borders Mexico, was formerly part of Mexico, and has a large population of
people of Mexican ancestry. Fourth, the reactions of Texas state officials to the
Avena decision have been among the most notable in the nation." Fifth, the
best opportunity to resolve this matter lies with a Texas case, Medellin v.
Dretke, currently before the United States Supreme Court; the Court is
expected to hand down a decision in June 2005.12 Finally, the conduct of Texas
officials reflects a nationwide reluctance to abide by the Vienna Convention,
which in turn underscores apprehension about the authority of international law
more generally.13
The Avena ruling turned on a treaty obligation of the United States
government. Under the Vienna Convention, the United States and 165 other
countries committed themselves to a regime intended to "contribute to the
development of friendly relations among nations, irrespective of their differing
constitutional and social systems. 14 The treaty attempts to assure consistent,
reciprocal behavior among the signatory states in matters regarding their
consulates and consular employers stationed abroad. The Avena decision dealt
with services that consulates provide to their nationals who have been arrested
and incarcerated for criminal offenses in the receiving state. Indeed, one of the
prime purposes of any consulate is to assist nationals who encounter difficulty
in foreign lands.
Avena involved foreign nationals who were convicted of various crimes in
U.S. courts, including heinous murders. Presumably these individuals received
as much due process as U.S. citizens in similar cases. The consular function,
however, is not simply an unavailing courtesy. Indeed, having one's consulate
notified of arrest and receiving its assistance are rights that evolve from the
same concerns and principles that underlie procedural rights within the U.S.
criminal justice system. Nation-states enter into treaties like the Vienna
Convention because they recognize the significance of such rights. They
promise to allow the kind of consular activities described, and in return receive
assurance that their own nationals will benefit from the same protections.
Unfortunately, subdivisions in federal systems, such as provinces or states,
11. See infra Section III.B. For example, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, who served as
counsel to then-governor George Bush, responded to a State Department inquiry to the Governor in
another case and stated that Texas did not have any obligations under the Vienna Convention. Al
Kamen, Virtually Blushing, WASH. POST, June 23, 1997, at A17.
12. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (No. 04-5928).
13. See generally EDWARD C. LUCK, MIXED MESSAGES: AMERICAN POLITICS AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, 1919-1999, at 41-75 (1999).
14. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, pmbl., 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S.
261,262.
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do not always uphold reciprocal agreements arranged by their central
government to protect national interests.1 5 In the United States, the problem
stems from state sovereignty, which derives from the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments of the Constitution. In essence, the fifty states are repositories of
all powers not explicitly granted to the federal government.' 6 Law enforcement
is traditionally among those powers.
Of course, under the Supremacy Clause,17 all federal laws, including
treaties, are placed above state laws, and any perceived state interest must be
subordinated to the national interest. 18 Reality can become complicated in those
situations where the state's police powers pose an almost insurmountable
obstacle to incursions of the federal government. But where the federal
government is acting within its plenary powers, as it is when it reaches
agreements with other nations, state prerogatives, even when deeply embedded
in the residual Tenth Amendment powers, should eventually submit to the
federal will.19
Consequently, Texas is obliged to follow the Vienna Convention as
interpreted in Avena. First, Avena is now the prevailing interpretation of the
treaty to which the United States is a party.20 Second, under the Vienna
Convention and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the United
States is required to abide by the rulings of the World Court. If the United
States is not going to comply, that decision should be made in Washington,
D.C., not in Austin.
2'
15. In a number of limited cases, U.S. states do enter into agreements with foreign entities, but for
most matters of "state," as national interests are characterized, political subdivisions do not have the
resources or authority to interact with foreign countries. Constitutional framer Rufus King described the
role of the several states of the Union in foreign affairs in the following way:
'The states were not 'sovereigns' in the sense contended for by some. They did not possess the
peculiar features of sovereignty,-they could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor
treaties. Considering them as political beings, they were dumb, for they could not speak to any
foreign sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for they could not hear any propositions from
such sovereign. They had not even the organs or faculties of defence or offence, for they could
not of themselves raise troops, or equip vessels, for war.' 5 Elliot's Debates, 212.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 317 (1936).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2.
18. For a consideration of this principle in foreign affairs, see generally Curtiss-Wright 299 U.S. at
317, and Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-33 (1920).
19. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
20. As the highest court under the United Nations system with jurisdiction to hear matters involving
treaties, there is no other competing interpretation from another tribunal or entity recognized by the
world community.
21. The Bush Administration, in fact, recently decided to withdraw the United States from the
Vienna Convention's Optional Protocol, which gave the ICJ authority to determine when the rights of
nationals have been violated. See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. POST,
Mar. 10, 2005, at Al. The Administration's decision, however, "does not affect the rest of the Vienna
Convention," id., nor does it alter the obligation of the United States to comply with the ICJ's ruling in
Avena as it applies to the fifty-two death penalty cases at issue therein. The Administration has admitted
as much, instructing state courts to provide the required review and reconsideration. See supra notes 9-
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For all of these reasons, this Article argues that Texas should neither
minimize nor ignore the ruling of the World Court. Given Texas's contentious
history with the death penalty, it is in the state's best interest to abide by the
Avena decision and provide meaningful "review and reconsideration" of the
cases at issue. In short, if Texas hopes to maintain any semblance of a moral
high ground on the issue of the death penalty, and-perhaps more
importantly-if Texas expects to maintain and strengthen business, political,
and cultural relationships with Mexico, it is in Texas's best interests to respond
to the World Court decision in a careful, thoughtful and deliberative way, rather
than in a dismissive manner.
This Article also contends that the federal government, through the Justice
and State Departments should be proactive in observing state behavior. As
noted, enforcement of the Vienna Convention has been contentious for years,
most notably in the late 1990s. The federal government could have imposed a
clear obligation on the states not to interfere with American foreign policy,
perhaps backed with the threat of litigation. Instead, in at least two death
penalty cases, the federal government requested only that state officials be
cognizant of the Convention.
22
Part I of this Article discusses the various public policy reasons why Texas
should provide meaningful "review and reconsideration" of the sixteen Texas
death sentences addressed in the Avena decision. Part I also considers the
policy implications of following the Avena decision. Part II provides a broad
overview and brief history of the Texas death penalty in order to illustrate that
the Vienna Convention is only one of the latest of the many contentious issues
that continue to plague the state's capital punishment system. Texas officials'
failure to follow the dictates of the Vienna Convention takes on added
significance in light of the vagaries of the Texas death penalty. Having
considered the various public policy reasons militating in favor of Texas's
compliance with the Avena decision, Parts III and IV analyze the two strands of
law affecting the Avena case: international and domestic. Part III addresses the
Avena decision, the Vienna Convention, and the United States' compliance
obligations. Part IV considers the international law issues in Avena and the
possible impact of a Supreme Court decision in Medellin, especially with
respect to the concept of federal nation-states in international law. Finally, Part
V examines how principles of United States constitutional law, particularly
federalism, affect U.S. obligations under international law.
10 and accompanying text.
22. The State Department is reported to have asked then-Governor George Bush to give attention to
the issue of notification regarding an inmate awaiting execution in 1997. Kamen, supra note 11. In the
ICJ case of Germany v. United States (LaGrand), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27), the ICJ made clear its
disappointment with State Department efforts to prevent the execution of an Arizona inmate following
an order of provisional measures issued by the ICJ shortly before the execution was conducted.
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I. PUBLIC POLICY REASONS FOR TEXAS'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE A VENA
DECISION
There is a panoply of public policy reasons why Texas should comply with
the Avena decision. The reasons fall into two basic categories: the significance
of maintaining a strong Texas-Mexico relationship and the importance of
fostering an international legal society.
A. Texas-Mexico Relations
As a state that shares a 1200-mile international border with Mexico, Texas
has a special relationship with its neighbor to the south, driven by a
commonality of people, history, custom, culture, language, and more recently,
by strong commercial interdependence. A recent study from the Inter-American
Development Bank found that Latin American immigrants in Texas were
expected to send more than $3 billion in remittances to their countries of origin
in 2004, with Mexico receiving 91% of this amount.23 Citizens of Texas and
Mexico often interact informally along the Texas/Mexico border, and the
governments of Texas and Mexico have taken steps to formalize this
relationship.
Since 1971, Texas has maintained a "State of Texas Mexico Office" in
Mexico City, which "works to strengthen trade, investment and tourism ties
between Texas and Mexico" and "provides Texas businesses and communities
with a voice in Mexico, as well as contacts to facilitate doing business in
Mexico." 24 While some may wonder what would cause a state to establish an
official presence in a foreign country, the State of Texas Mexico Office's own
justification provides a simple answer:
As Texas' closest foreign neighbor and partner in the North American Free Trade
Agreement, Mexico is the largest foreign market for Texas merchandise export. In
1998, Texas merchandise exports to Mexico totaled $36.6 billion. Roughly one-
third of all Texas exports are destined for Mexico. Moreover, Texas accounts for
nearly half of total U.S. export[s] to Mexico. Texas' transportation infrastructure
serves as the principal conduit for trade between Mexican and U.S. economic
centers, and the state's relationship to Mexico is further strengthened by strong
23. See INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK, SENDING MONEY HOME: REMITTANCES FROM THE LATIN
AMERICA TO US, 2004 (2004), available at http://www.iadb.org/mif/v2/ files/map2004survey.pdf (last
visited Apr. 26, 2005); David Hendricks, Remittances to Mexico Are Huge Piece of Big Pie, SAN
ANTONIO ExPREss-NEWS, June 30, 2004, at IE (noting that Mexican workers in the United States sent
home $13.3 billion in remittances in 2003, which was third only to maquiladoras ($18.4 billion) and oil
exports ($15 billion) in terms of foreign exchange between Mexico and the United States, and
concluding that "Mexico, thanks to its proximity to the United States, receives the most remittances of
all of the world's nations"); Heman Rozemberg, Texas Migrants Send $3 Billion Home, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, May 18, 2004, at IA.
24. Tex. Econ. Dev., State of Texas-Mexico Office, at http://www.tded.state.tx.us/Trade/
mxfyi.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
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cultural and historical ties.
25
Executive Order 98_01,26 signed by then-Texas Governor George W. Bush
and then-Texas Secretary of State Alberto Gonzalez,
27 on July 22, 1998, further
acknowledges the important ties between Texas and Mexico. It declares that
"Texas greatly values its relationship with Mexico and regards a friendly and
cooperative relationship with Mexico as being of immense importance to
Texas," and it designates the Texas Secretary of State as the "Chief Liaison to
Mexico and the Border Region of Texas."
28
Texas is also one of the ten U.S. and Mexican states (five in each country)
that participate in the so-called "Border Governors Conferences." The
conferences seek to improve communication and business between and among
the ten U.S./Mexico border states.29 The Texas governor frequently travels to
Mexico to visit Mexican officials for the specific purpose of fostering
economic and social/political ties.
30
These close social, political, historical, and economic ties between Texas
and Mexico should make it incumbent on Texas to treat its southern neighbor
with dignity and respect, and to provide meaningful "review and
reconsideration" of the sixteen Texas cases at issue in Avena. Many
government officials and citizens in Mexico strongly oppose the death penalty
in the United States 31 and, more specifically, its application to Mexican
nationals. 32 Mexican President Vicente Fox cancelled an August 2002 trip to
25. Id; see also Tex. Econ. Dev., State of Texas-Mexico Office, at
http://www.tded.state.tx.us/mexico (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
26. Tex. Exec. Order No. GWB 98-01, 24 Tex. Reg. 279 (Jan. 15, 1999), available at
http://texinfo.library.unt.edu/texasregister/pdf/I999/0155is.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
27. Alberto Gonzalez, who would later become a Texas Supreme Court Justice, went on to serve as
White House Counsel to President George W. Bush, and recently became the first Hispanic United
States Attorney General.
28. Tex. Exec. Order No. GWB 98-01, supra note 26. These dual designations for the Texas
Secretary of State, in turn, resulted in the creation of a "Texas Border & Mexico Affairs Division"
within the Texas Secretary of State's office. Tex. Sec. of State, Texas Border and Mexican Affairs
Division, at http://www.sos.state.tx.us/border/index.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 2005). The Texas
Legislature subsequently passed House Bill 564, which led to the additional designation of the Texas
Secretary of State as the "Border Commerce Coordinator." See Letter from George W. Bush, Governor
of Texas, to Elton Bomer, Texas Secretary of State (July 20, 1999), http://www.sos.state.tx.us/border/
comcoord.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
29. See Border Governors Conference, History, at http://www.edd.state.nm.us/BordGov/
history.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
30. See, e.g., Dane Schiller, Texas Gov Trying to Win Trust in Mexico, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, June 25, 2004, at IA ("During his visit, [Governor] Perry met with Mexican President Vicente
Fox, two Cabinet members and the governors of the border states of Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas and
Coahila.").
31. See, e.g., Dane Schiller, Justice Doesn't Always Translate Across Border, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 27, 2004, at IA (noting that President Fox's "disdain" for the death penalty in the
United States "follows a long political traditional in Mexico").
32. Id. (noting that President Fox has proposed that the death penalty be eliminated in Mexico and
"has vowed to fight its application in the United States," stating that "Mexicans long have been
outspoken about capital punishment in the United States, and media reports here often portray Mexicans
who face it as having been framed or unfairly judged by a racist system").
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Texas on the eve of Texas's execution of a Mexican national, Javier Sudrez
Medina, to demonstrate how seriously he opposed the death penalty.33 At least
one news agency characterized the move as an "'unequivocal repudiation' of
the execution of a Mexican citizen. ' 34 A phone call from President Bush to
President Fox, a few days after the Avena decision, also reflected the
significance of the death sentences in relations with Mexico. Their "seven-
minute conversation [was] part of the two leaders' mutual promise to stay in
close contact." 35 Phone calls, however, will not assuage Mexican concerns
about use of the death penalty against Mexican nationals. Peter Ward,
Executive Director of the Mexico Studies Center at the University of Texas at
Austin, has declared:
Diplomatically, [the death penalty] represents an open and running sore for U.S.-
Mexico relations.... This distracts from normal relations.... And when the
execution goes ahead in spite of the president's and often the Pope's personal
appeals, then it is viewed as a slap in the face and an indication of arrogance and
indifference to world opinion.
36
The notion that Texas should abide by the dictates of the Vienna
Convention and the Avena decision is not without political support. Indeed, the
2004 Texas Democratic Party platform explicitly calls for recognition of "[t]he
right to consular notification, to provide non-U.S. citizens arrested in Texas
their right under international law to contact their consulates. 37 Furthermore,
on May 31, 2004, the San Antonio Express-News published a scathing editorial
in which it concluded:
Texas has 16 Mexican citizens on death row. Because Gov. Rick Perry has been
unresponsive, the World Court's ruling is unlikely to have any effect on these cases.
That is a mistake.... This nation would be in a stronger position to exert pressure
on Mexico if states abide by the World Court ruling and review the 51 death row
cases-beginning with those in Texas.... While the World Court has no power to
enforce Ithe Vienna Convention], the United States ignores it at the peril of its
citizens.
33. See Mexico's Application Instituting Proceedings at 12, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1 (Mar. 31) (No. 128) ("As a result of the execution of Mr. Suarez, the
President of Mexico cancelled his announced official visit to Texas to formally protest the violation of
international law. In a press release issued on the day of the execution by the Office of the President, the
position of Mexico on Article 36 was reiterated."), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imus iapplication 20030109.PDF (last visited Apr. 26, 2005);
see also Susana Hayward, Fox Calls Off Visit to Lone Star State: Action Taken to Protest Texas'
Execution of Cop-Killer, SAN ANTONIO ExPREss-NEWS, Aug 15, 2002, at IA.
34. Hayward, supra note 33.
35. U.S., Mexican Presidents Discuss World Court Ruling Against U.S. Death Penalty Cases, AP
ONLINE, Apr. 13, 2004, Westlaw, APWIRES database.
36. Schiller, supra note 31 (quoting Peter Ward).
37. Tex. Democratic Party, 2004 Texas Democratic Party Platform, available at
http://www.txdemocrats.org/about/platform/page3/index.php (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
38. Editorial, Our Turn: To Protect Americans, U.S. Must Heed Court, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, May 31, 2004, at 6B (emphasis added). The editorial also proclaimed, "If the United States
expects its citizens arrested in Mexico to be able to contact U.S. consular officials without delay, then
this nation should heed a recent World Court ruling to review the cases of 51 Mexican nationals on
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Echoing these sentiments, Stephen M. Schwebel, a judge on the World Court
from 1981-2000 and its president from 1997-2000, has declared:
No country has more at stake in performance under the [Vienna] treaty than does
the U.S., many thousands of whose citizens travel the world. When Americans
abroad are arrested, the importance of assuring that they can contact a U.S. consul
in order to communicate with their families and benefit by the assistance of legal
counsel is obvious. But it is reciprocal. If police and courts in the U.S. routinely
ignore their obligations under that convention, how can it be expected that U.S.
nationals will enjoy its protection?
39
It is this expectation of "reciprocal" treaty obligations that underlies all of the
public policy arguments supporting Texas's compliance with the Avena
decision. If Texas expects and desires good relations with Mexico, in which
notions of fairness, justice, and adherence to the rule of law are respected by
both sides, then Texas must act accordingly.
A recent lawsuit by Texas farmers and irrigation officials against the
Mexican government illustrates this point. In the summer of 2004, several
Texas farmers and irrigation officials filed a $500 million lawsuit against
Mexico for allegedly violating a 1944 water treaty entered into by the United
States and Mexico.40 The lawsuit arose from years of conflict between the
United States and Mexico regarding the treaty and water disputes.
41 Given
Texas's geographical location and the importance of water to the South Texas
region, it is clear why these issues are so vital to the state.
42 Indeed, Texas
death row here." Id.; see also Hines, supra note 4 (urging Texas and the United States to comply with
the Avena decision and noting that "[t]he ICJ's order is not onerous"). But see Schiller, supra note 31
(discussing the Mexican criminal justice system's problematic treatment of U.S. citizens and concluding
that Mexico, "[w]ith a justice system even its own president brands corrupt, . . . would seem hard
pressed to criticize how accused criminals are treated in the United States").
39. Stephen M. Schwebel, Letter to the Editor, Why We Need International Court of Justice, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 14, 2004, at A15 (emphasis added).
40. See Angry Texas Farmers Sue Mexico, UPI, Aug. 30, 2004, LEXIS, News Library, Wire
Services Stories File; Mariano Castillo, Legislators Support Irrigators in Valley, SAN ANTONIO
ExPREss-NEWS, Sept. 9, 2004, at 5B; see also Treaty Respecting Utilization of Waters of the Colorado
and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Nov. 14, 1944, U.S.-Mex., art. 2, 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter
1944 Water Treaty].
41. See Susan Combs, The Mexico Water Debt, 67 TEx. B.J. 198, 198 (2004) ("Two countries with
a shared culture, history, and drive for a scarce resource in a region marked by recurring droughts and
explosive growth-not surprisingly, tension exists between them. That fairly describes the present
situation between the United States and Mexico with respect to their demands for water."); Melissa
Lopez, Border Tensions and the Need for Water: An Application of Equitable Principles To Determine
Water Allocation from the Rio Grande to the United States and Mexico, 9 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV.
489 (1997) ("As co-riparians along the Rio Grande, the United States and Mexico have historically had
to deal with border conflicts regarding water rights.... [I]ncreasing border populations and particularly
harsh weather conditions have created new problems which have not been resolved so effectively.");
Carlos Marin, Bi-National Border Water Supply Issues from the Perspective of the IBWC, 11 U.S.-MEX.
L.J. 35 (2003) ("Although meetings between U.S. President George W. Bush and his Mexican
counterpart, Vicente Fox, [regarding outstanding water issues] have yielded some agreements, progress
is slow and complete resolution of the dilemma remains elusive.").
42. Damien M. Schiff, Rollin', Rollin', Rollin' on the River: A Story of Drought, Treaty, Treaty
Interpretation, and Other Rio Grande Problems, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 117, 117-18 (2003)
("The problems posed by this dispute are more than academic. Scarcity of water in the Rio Grande Basin
has produced serious economic consequences for both countries.... The dispute over the treaty's
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officials attempted to resolve the dispute in Mexico City before the farmers
filed suit.43 Despite the efforts of U.S. and Texas officials, however, the
farmers and irrigation officials proceeded with their private action. They
claimed that, after years of frustration with both U.S. and Mexican officials,
they had "run out of options.
'"4
As of September 2004, the U.S. Department of State had taken no official
position on the litigation, but had expressed its desire to continue to "pursue a
resolution through diplomacy. ''45 Texas officials, however, have not been so
reticent. On September 8, 2004, the Texas Senate Select Committee on Water
Policy made news around the State when it went on the record in support of the
lawsuit and promised to urge federal officials to make settling the suit a top
priority. 46 Texas State Senator Eddie Lucio (D-Brownsville), a member of the
Water Policy Committee, unequivocally declared, "I'm going to be voicing this
concern and being critical of our administration in Washington if they don't get
up and call Mexico to the carpet on this. I intend to carry any piece of
legislation that is necessary. ' '47 Other top Texas officials have expressed public
support for the litigation, including Texas's two Republican U.S. Senators, two
Democratic members of the U.S. House of Representatives, and Texas
Agriculture Commissioner Susan Combs.48
The lawsuit by "angry Texas farmers" and irrigation officials against the
government of Mexico helps to focus the issue of compliance with the Avena
decision. Put simply, if Texas and Texans expect Mexico to act as a good
neighbor and adhere to the 1944 Water Treaty, then Texans must also
appreciate and respect the similar importance of the death penalty to Mexico
and Mexicans and abide by the Vienna Convention and the Avena.49 In short,
interpretation could lead to the upset of a sixty-year old Rio Grande legal regime."); Jenny B. Davis, La
Agua Vida Behind the Tex-Mex Water Dispute, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Nov. 22, 2002, WL 1 No. 45
ABAJEREP 7 ("Since 1992, Mexico has been in major breach of an international water-sharing
agreement, and the impact is being felt far beyond the gulf. The country currently owes the United
States approximately 1.45 million acre-feet of vater.... Hit hardest are [South Texas] Valley farmers
who make a living from crops like sugarcane and citrus. Texas economists estimate the drop in
agriculture production has cost the state nearly $1 billion in revenue.").
43. Angry Texas Farmers Sue Mexico, supra note 40 ("Texas state officials have also tried to lobby
for a resolution of the dispute in Mexico City .. "). The farmers also considered filing suit against the
United States, but decided that the suit would be unavailing. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. ("'We understand the irrigators' frustration, but we believe we have made progress on this
issue through diplomacy,' said State Department spokesman Edgar Vasquez. 'We intend to continue our
diplomatic efforts to ensure that Mexico fulfills its treaty obligation and to work cooperatively with
Mexico to ensure reliable water deliveries to the U.S. during periods of abundance and scarcity."')
46. Castillo, supra note 40.
47. Id. (quoting State Sen. Lucio).
48. Id.
49. Of course, water rights is only one of many issues on which Texas and the United States want
Mexican cooperation. See, e.g., Hugh Dellios, U.S., Mexico Mend Extradition Gap, CFH. TRIB., July 4,
2004, at C3 (discussing Mexico's increasing compliance with the extradition of individuals back to the
United States).
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what is ultimately called for is reciprocity of respect and understanding.
B. Fostering International Legal Society
As important as reciprocal respect is the need for the United States to
overcome its fears of an international legal society. Texas officials' response to
the Avena decision is rooted in a very "American" suspicion of outside
involvement in national sovereign functions.50 Government officials and
citizens tend to view the criminal justice system and the rulings and
punishments meted out under that system as an internal affair. While this is not
an unusual sentiment, the difference between the United States and other
sovereign nations is one of degree: the United States, of late, has been fiercely
protective of its sovereignty. Its concern is not without basis. As the U.S.
memorial in the Avena case points out, Mexico has not committed to the same
level of compliance with the Vienna Convention that it seeks to impose on the
United States.51
The United States, however, undertook certain obligations when it signed
the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the Vienna
Convention. Treaties, like contracts, are meant to limit range of options
available to signatories. By entering into a treaty, the parties exchange ultimate
freedom-in the case of states, sovereignty-for something in return. 52 By
signing the Vienna Convention, the United States secured a commitment that
its citizens and diplomatic agents would be protected.53 Indeed, membership in
the Vienna Convention brings many benefits to U.S. consular interests
worldwide, and the notification provision of Article 36 continues to be a
godsend to countless American travelers abroad. If the Convention benefits the
United States because other nations comply with its term, then the United
States must reciprocate and comply as well.
The ICJ took up the Avena case because the United States specifically
approved the Vienna Convention's Optional Protocol. The ICJ's jurisdiction
was not thrust upon the United States by powers unsympathetic to U.S.
interests. Even if the ICJ makes a decision that the United States dislikes, it is
not acting ultra vires. When the United States entered into the relevant treaties,
it agreed to be bound by the provisions of those documents and, by extension,
ICJ decisions like Avena.
50. See generally Luck, supra note 13, at 41-75.
51. Counter-Memorial of the United States of America at 199 (Chapter VIII), Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. I (Mar. 31) (No. 128), at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuspleadings/imus ipleadingstoc.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
52. See Craig L. Jackson, Harmonization and Worker Rights in the European Union: A Model for
North America? 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 1, 59 n.432 (1995).
53. Michael Fleischman, Reciprocity Unmasked: The Role of the Mexican Government in Defense
of its Foreign Nationals in United States Death Penalty Cases, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 359, 361
(2003).
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Some critics of the ICJ have tried to distort the debate by declaring that, if
the United States complies with all ICJ decisions, the ICJ will essentially
become a court of criminal appeal. The reality, however, is that the ICJ cannot
use coercion, physical or otherwise, to enforce its rulings. Moreover, the United
States has the ability to opt out of the ICJ, either totally or provisionally, as it
did in the case of Nicaragua v. United States.54 There, in a dispute involving
U.S. paramilitary actions in Nicaragua during the Sandinista regime, the United
States believed that the ICJ erred when it ruled that Nicaragua had standing to
sue under a procedural device in the Statute of the International Court of Justice
known as the Optional Clause.55 As a result, the United States temporarily
withdrew its consent to suit before that body.
56
The United States recently made a similar decision in response to the Avena
case. Decision should be made by federal government, not the states. Critics
responded harshly to the withdrawal, but it still presents a viable option if the
United States believes that the ICJ has overstepped its bounds with the Avena
ruling.
On March 7, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice sent a two-
paragraph letter to U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan informing him that the
United States was withdrawing from the Vienna Convention's Optional
Protocol. While that withdrawal may mean that the United States "will not have
to bow to the ICJ again," it does not alter the country's obligation to follow ICJ
rulings, including Avena, that have already been handed down.57 Indeed, the
Bush Administration has indicated its intention to abide by the Avena
judgment. 58 And if the United States wishes to enjoy the goodwill and mutual
benefit secured by the Convention, it must continue to adhere to the
Convention's provisions even if it is not subject to the authority of the ICJ.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN TEXAS
To understand the complex challenge the Avena decision poses for the state
of Texas, widely considered "the nation's foremost executioner," 59 observers
must first examine the historical and contemporary significance of capital
punishment in Texas. As is true of all states with a death penalty statute, the
54. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); see generally Keith Highet, The Peace Palace Heats Up, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 646, 647 (1991).
55. Highet, supra note 54.
56. U.S. Dep't of State, Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by
Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice (Jan. 18, 1985), 24 I.L.M 246 (1985).
57. Lane, supra note 21.
58. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
59. RICHARD C. DIETER, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE FUTURE OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
THE U.S.: A TEXAS-SIZED CRisis, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=45&did=489
(May 1994).
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history of the death penalty in Texas can best be understood in relation to
Furman v. Georgia.60 The landmark 1972 Supreme Court decision declared all
existing death penalty statutes unconstitutional. Furman, however, did not
entirely prohibit the use of capital punishment; instead it declared the death
penalty unconstitutional as presently administered. In Furman's aftermath,
numerous states quickly revamped their capital punishment systems.61 Texas
was one of the first states to reform its capital punishment system in an effort to
comply with Furman, passing new legislation in 1973.62 The state conducted its
first post-Furman execution in 1982.63
The history of the Texas death penalty divides into pre-Furman and post-
Furman eras. The pre-Furman history separates further into two significant
periods: 1819-1923, and 1923-72. Efforts to curb illegal lynching and centralize
the administration of the death penalty marked the 1819-1923 period.
Watershed legislation in 1923 accomplished those goals. During the 1923-72
period, 361 men were executed in Texas under the new centralized regime. A
July 1964 moratorium suspended all executions until the Furman ruling. The
post-Furman era, referred to as the "modern death penalty era" in Texas,
64
includes all capital activity since 1972.
A. Capital Punishment in Texas Pre-Furman (1818-1923)
Texas has a long tradition of capital punishment. Mental images abound of
frontier public executions and brutal illegal lynchings. Executions and
lynchings were deemed necessary to preserve the boundary between order and
chaos. Violent ends for violent individuals appeared just and orderly. "'You
had to draw the line somewhere,' it was said."9
65
In their groundbreaking book, The Rope, the Chair, and the Needle: Capital
60. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
61. JAMES W. MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND THE NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
IN TEXAS, 1923-1990, at 129 (1994) (noting that "[s]tate legislatures were quick to oblige" with the
Furman Court's desire for new "more structured statutory guidelines," and that by 1976, only four years
after Furman, "new or revised capital punishment statutes had been passed in thirty-five states").
62. See id; Brent E. Newton, A Case Study in Systemic Unfairness: The Texas Death Penalty,
1973-1994, 1 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 3, 7 (1994); Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Death Row Facts,
at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/drowfacts.htm (last updated Dec. 19, 2003).
For a thorough treatment of the legislative history regarding Texas's efforts to revamp its death
penalty statute in response to Furman, see Michael Kuhn, Note, House Bill 200: The Legislative Attempt
To Reinstate Capital Punishment in Texas, 11 HOUS. L. REV. 410 (1974). This new death penalty
statutory scheme was subsequently upheld in 1976 by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976).
63. MARQUART ET AL., supra note 61, at 130; Newton, supra note 62, at 4; Tex. Dep't of Criminal
Justice, supra note 62.
64. TEX. DEFENDER SERV., A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 1
(2000), available at http://www.texasdefender.org/state%20ofo/20denialUChapl.pdf (last visited Apr.
26, 2005).
65. MARQUARTETAL., supra note 61, at ix.
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Punishment in Texas, 1923-1990, Professors James W. Marquart, Sheldon
Ekland-Olson, and Jonathan R. Sorenson powerfully chronicle that prior to
1923, public hangings and illegal lynchings in Texas were brutal and routine
and were carried out by local communities throughout the state. 66 The killings'
frequency began to subside by 1900. In 1923, state Senator J.W. Thomas
introduced a bill to reform Texas executions. Thomas won his seat by
advocating such reform in the aftermath of an incident in which three African-
Americans accused of a crime were literally "burned at the stake." 67 Senate Bill
63, motivated by the desire for more modem, humane, and centralized
executions, 68 abandoned the hangman's rope in favor of the electric chair and
removed all executions from the "emotional atmosphere" found in local
communities to the remote prison location of Huntsville, Texas. 69 Though it
aspired to make the death penalty regime more humane, the Act nevertheless
provided:
From and after the taking effect of this Act whenever the sentence of death is
pronounced against a convict, the sentence shall be executed at any time before the
hour of sunrise on the day set for the execution, not less than thirty days from the
date of sentence, as the court may adjudge, by causing to pass through the body of
the convict a current of electricity of sufficient intensity to cause death, and the
application and continuance of such current through the body of such convict until
such convict is dead.
70
The state also constructed a "Death Row," consisting of nine cells and one
shower, at the Huntsville prison, and it installed an electric chair there
(subsequently known as "Old Sparky") on December 1, 1923.71 The state
conducted its first executions by electrocution under the new statute shortly
after midnight on February 8, 1924. Five men, all African-American, 72 were
executed.7 3
66. Id. at ix, 1-12; see also Newton, supra note 62, at 3 ("Capital punishment has a prominent place
in this State's history, which simply reflects the generally violent climate historically associated with
Texas justice. Until 1924, when Texas began executing people in the newly-acquired electric chair
located in the state prison in Huntsville, the death penalty was largely a local concern, administered by
hanging at the county level.").
67. MARQUARTETAL., supra note 61, at 12, 13, 190.
68. For example, Section 14 of Senate Bill 63 specifically provided:
The fact that our present method of putting to death condemned convicts by hanging the
condemned in the counties where the judgment of death is obtained, frequently creates great
disturbance in the county, and the further fact that the system is antiquated and has been
supplanted in many states by the more modem and humane system of electrocution create an
emergency and an imperative public necessity ....
MARQUART ET AL., supra note 61, app. A, at 200 (quoting S.B. 63).
69. Id. at 13-15.
70. Id., app. A, at 197 (quoting S.B. 63) (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 15.
72. Id. at 19. Charles Reynolds was the first to be electrocuted under the newly revised Texas
statute, followed by Ewell Morris, George Washington, Mack Matthews, and finally Melvin Johnson.
Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Electrocutions, at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/prefurman/
electrocutions.htm (last updated May 7, 2002).
73. MARQUART ET AL., supra note 61, at 19.
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B. Capital Punishment in Texas Pre-Furman (1923-1972)
In the decades following the enactment of Senate Bill 63, executions in
Texas, and throughout the United States, increased and decreased for a variety
of complex reasons. In the 1960s, anti-capital punishment movements began to
take hold and lobby successfully for execution moratoriums. Texas enacted a
moratorium in July 1964 that remained in place until the Supreme Court's
decision in Furman.74 One commentator notes, "In those years before Furman
v. Georgia, the Texas death penalty was used almost exclusively against the
young, the ignorant and impoverished, racial minorities, and the mentally
disturbed; at the same time, practically every victim was white."75 Echoing this
sentiment, Professors Marquart, Ekland-Olson and Sorensen further conclude,
"Statistics such as these would eventually become the fulcrum for reversing
capital punishment statutes in the 1970s."76
C. Capital Punishment in Texas Post-Furman (1972-Present)
As mentioned above, after Furman, the Texas legislature quickly adopted
"a unique capital sentencing scheme" that it hoped would be responsive to the
Supreme Court's concerns. 77 The new system's "uniqueness" stemmed from
74. Id. at ix ("This hiatus in executions reflected widely discussed concerns with justice. Broadly
drawn, the question was, had moral standards evolved to such a point that capital punishment was no
longer tolerable, was no longer a punishment fit for any crime, was unconstitutional regardless of how it
was carried out?").
75. Newton, supra note 62, at 3 (footnote omitted). Between 1923 and 1972, the total number of
convicts sentenced to death in Texas was 506. Id. at 3. Of this number, 288 (56.9 percent) were African-
American, 171 (33.8 percent) were Anglo, 46 (9.1 percent) were Hispanic, and 1 (0.2 percent) were
"other." Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Racial and Gender Breakdown of Death Row Offenders 1923-
1973, at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/prefurman/racial.htm (last updated June 25, 2001).
A total of 361 of the individuals sentenced to death were actually executed by electrocution during
this period. MARQUART ET AL., supra note 61, at 21. Of those actually executed, 229 (63 percent) were
African-American, 107 (30 percent) were Anglo, 24 (7 percent) were Hispanic, and 1 (0.2 percent) was
"other." Id.; Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Racial Breakdown of Electrocuted Offenders, at
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/prefurman/electrocutionsracial.htm (last updated June 2, 2001).
During this period, eighty-two percent of the African-Americans sentenced to death were eventually
executed, compared to sixty-one percent of the Anglos and fifty percent of the Hispanics. MARQUART ET
AL., supra note 61, at 24. With respect to clemency, there were similar disparities: fourty-six percent of
Hispanic offenders' sentences were commuted, compared to only thirty-four percent of the white
offenders' and twenty percent of the African-American offenders' sentences. Id. With regard to race of
victim, eighty percent of the individuals sentenced to death were convicted of offenses involving white
victims, whereas only fifteen percent of these crimes involved African-American victims and only five
percent involved Hispanic victims. Id. In situations in which white victims were killed, seventy-three
percent resulted in executions, compared to sixty-two percent of cases involving African-American
victims and fourty-six percent involving Hispanic victims. Id.
Only three of the 510 individuals who received the death sentence between 1923 and 1972 were
female, but no women were actually executed during this time period. Id. at 23. The average age of
those executed was thirty years. Approximately fifty-two percent had less than a sixth grade education,
while a full ninty percent were not high school graduates; ten percent had never attended school. Id. at
23.
76. MARQUART ET AL., supra note 61, at 24.
77. Newton, supra note 62, at 7; see also MARQUART ET AL., supra note 61 at 130-31.
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the fact that, while most jurisdictions required juries in capital cases to weigh
both aggravating and mitigating circumstances when considering a sentence of
death, Texas juries were only asked to answer three narrow questions termed
"special issues":
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased.
78
A jury's unanimous, affirmative answer to all three "special issues"
automatically resulted in a death sentence. However, if ten or more jurors gave
a negative answer on any one "special issue," a life sentence resulted.79
A constitutional challenge to the new statutory scheme, specifically the
"special issues" component and its mandatory nature and rigidity, was swift but
ultimately unsuccessful. In Jurek v. Texas, the Supreme Court upheld the new
legislation.80 Jurek was the first Texas dealth penalty case post-Furman to
reach the U.S. Supreme Court, but it was by no means the last. At least six
additional rulings-Franklin v. Lynaugh,
81 Penry v. Lynaugh ("Penry i,),82
Graham v. Collins,83 Johnson v. Texas,84 Penry v. Johnson ("Penry J'),85 and
Tennard v. Dretke8 6-have addressed continuing challenges to Texas's use of
"special issues" in its capital punishment scheme.
Since Furman, the Supreme Court has addressed other aspects of the Texas
death penalty system as well. In the 1980 case of Adams. v. Texas,87 the Court,
78. TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 1981).
79. See MARQUART ET AL., supra note 61, at 13; TEx. DEFENDER SERV., supra note 64, at 3 n.18;
Newton, supra note 62, at 7.
80. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
81. 487 U.S. 164 (1988) (rejecting a constitutional challenge asserting that the exclusion of certain
mitigating evidence by narrow "special issues" inquiry violated the Eighth Amendment).
82. 492 U.S. 302, 322-25 (1989) (holding the Texas "special issues" rule unconstitutional because
framework was not broad enough to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of mental
retardation and childhood abuse).
83. 506 U.S. 461 (1993) (finding on technical grounds no constitutional violation for exclusion of
mitigating evidence not included in Penry I, including positive character traits, youth, and deprived
childhood).
84. 509 U.S. 350 (1993) (upholding the constitutionality of the Texas death penalty statute and
finding that mitigating evidence of a defendant's youth was within "effective reach" of a capital
sentencing jury).
85. 532 U.S. 782, 784 (2001) (clarifying that "the key under Penry P' is the jury's ability to
"'consider and give effect to' the defendant's mitigating evidence (quoting Penry 1, 492 U.S. at 319)).
86. 124 S. Ct. 2562, 2572 (2004) ("[W]e cannot countenance the suggestion that low IQ evidence is
not relevant mitigating evidence .... Reasonable jurists could conclude that the low IQ evidence
Tennard presented was relevant mitigating evidence. Evidence of significantly impaired intellectual
functioning is obviously evidence that might serve as a basis for a sentence less than death.").
87. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
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in an 8-1 decision, held Texas Penal Code Section 12.31(b) unconstitutional.
That provision required capital jurors swear an oath that the possibility of
rendering a death sentence would not impact their deliberations.88 In 1981, in
89Estelle v. Smith, the Court held that Texas's practice of having prosecution
psychiatrists conduct obligatory ex parte interviews with defendants violated
the defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment constitutional rights.90 The rulings
in Adams and Estelle ultimately invalidated numerous Texas death sentences.
9 1
In 1983, in Barefoot v. Estelle, the Supreme Court refused to ban
psychiatrists from testifying about the defendant's "future dangerousness," and
refused to bar the use of psychiatrists altogether.92 The 1988 and 1989 cases of
Satterwhite v. Texas93 and Powell v. Texas94 expanded and clarified the
Supreme Court's prior holdings on the use of psychiatric testimony in capital
trials. In Herrera v. Collins, a 1993 case exploring the limits of habeas relief,
the Supreme Court held that a defendant could be executed, despite his claim of
"actual innocence," if the defendant's trial was "fair" and the defendant was
permitted to seek clemency.95 Herrera "received international condemnation"
and "ranks as one of those infamous Supreme Court opinions, like Lochner and
Plessy, that is utterly repugnant to any basic sense of fairness."
96
The Supreme Court's next occasion to consider the Texas death penalty as
applied came in 2003 in Miller-El v. Cockrell.97 That case centered on the
alleged "formal policy" of the Dallas County District Attorney to use
peremptory challenges to exclude racial and ethnic minorities from juries. The
Court did not rule on the merits of Miller-El's claims but rather held that the
Fifth Circuit had wrongfully denied a "certificate of appealability" because
reasonable minds could have differed about whether the prosecution's use of
peremptory strikes was purposeful discrimination. The Court remanded the
case for further proceedings. After granting the certificate of appealability, the
Fifth Circuit considered Miller-El's claims on the merits in Miller-El v. Dretke
and again denied relief.
98
88. Id. at 42.
89. 451 U.S. 454(1981).
90. Id. at 468 ("A criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to
introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements
can be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding.").
91. See MARQUART, ET AL., supra note 61, at 137; TEx. DEFENDER SERV., supra note 64, at 1 n.6
(noting that Penry, Estelle, and Adams "invalidated well over 100 death sentences"); Newton, supra
note 62, at 11.
92. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
93. 486 U.S. 249 (1988).
94. 492 U.S. 680 (1989).
95. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
96. Newton, supra note 62, at 34.
97. 537 U.S. 322 (2003).
98. 361 F.3d 849 (5th Cir. 2004).
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More recently, on February 24, 2004, in Banks v. Dretke,99 the Supreme
Court overruled a Fifth Circuit decision holding that a Texas death row
defendant had both waited too long to raise issues of prosecutorial misconduct
and raised the issues in the wrong forum. The Court declared forcefully that
"[w]hen police or prosecutors conceal significant exculpatory or impeaching
material in the State's possession, it is ordinarily incumbent on the State to set
the record straight."'' 00 These Supreme Court pronouncements on the Texas
death penalty are not the end of the story. Miller-El, following his second
denial by the Fifth Circuit, once again appealed to the Supreme Court and, on
June 28, 2004, the Court granted certiorari.101 And, on December 10, 2004, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear Medellin v. Dretke. 1
02
Thus, beginning with Jurek, and continuing largely unabated throughout the
subsequent three decades, the "modem era" of the Texas death penalty has
been the source of much of the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence.
According to Robert Kepple, director of the Texas District and County
Attorney's Association, "Because Texas has a lot of death penalty cases,
naturally a lot of major cases decided by the Supreme Court have been-and
are going to be-from Texas."'1 3 But other commentators have been much
more direct and critical. According to one, "[T]he State of Texas, the
bellwether of the modem death penalty... has been a breeding ground for
unfairness in the administration of capital punishment, which has evoked
national and international condemnation."'04 Writing in 1994 and citing twenty-
seven scholarly sources in support of his thesis, Brent E. Newton observed,
"Vehement scholarly criticism of post-Furman Texas capital sentencing
procedures has been voiced repeatedly on a wide variety of grounds. Indeed,
with [one] possible exception... scholarly treatment of Texas sentencing
procedures has been unequivocal in its condemnation."
10 5
Since Newton's pronouncement, the study, commentary, and condemnation
of the Texas death penalty has remained unrelenting. A 1994 report from the
Death Penalty Information Center declared, "The death penalty in Texas is in a
state of crisis."' 0 6 Six years later, the Texas Defender Service proclaimed the
Texas death penalty "a thoroughly flawed system.., in desperate need of
reform."' 0 7 And a 2002 law review article concluded:
99. 540 U.S. 668 (2004).
100. Id. at 675-76.
101. Miller-El v. Dretke, 361 F.3d 849 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct 2908 (2004).
102. 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 686 (2004).
103. Maro Robbins, Lone Star State Executions May Be Under Microscope, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, July 8, 2004, at 1A (quoting Robert Kepple).
104. Newton, supra note 62, at 2.
105. Newton, supra note 79, at 6-7 n.31.
106. DIETER, supra note 59.
107. TEX. DEFENDER SERV., supra note 64, at Executive Summary (Conclusion).
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It is not enough to turn the key, the people of Texas want to wield the terrible swift
sword. They do not want to lock the murderer safely away in prison, feeding him,
filling the cavities in his teeth, and dosing him with generic Prozac to relieve his
depression. The people of Texas want his head on a pike at the entrance to their
city. 10
Clearly, problems with the Texas death penalty 
remain. 09
D. Texas Death Row Characteristics in the Aftermath of Furman
Despite the Texas legislature's swift enactment of a post-Furman death
penalty statute in 1973, Texas did not conduct an execution until December 7,
1982, when it executed Charlie Brooks, Jr. 110 As of April 20, 2005, the state
had executed 341 individuals during the "modem era" alone."' Of this number,
173 (fifty-one percent) were white, 117 (thirty-four percent) were African-
American, 49 (fourteen percent) were Hispanic, and 2 (one percent) were
categorized as "other." ' 1 2 Those 341 executions account for thirty-six percent
of the total post-Furman executions nationwide." 
3 Texas has executed more
than three-and-a-half times as many people as Virginia, the state with the next
highest number of post-Furman executions.
14 Between 2000 and 2004, Texas
executed forty, seventeen, thirty-three, twenty-four, and twenty-three
individuals, respectively." 5 Although Texas is only one of the thirty-eight
states with a death penalty, 116 during each of those five years, Texas has
accounted for approximately one-quarter to almost one-half of all executions
nationwide."17
108. Janet Morrow & Robert Morrow, In a Narrow Grave: Texas Punishment Law in Capital
Murder Cases, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 979, 986 (2002).
109. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT'L, THE DEATH PENALTY IN TEXAS: LETHAL INJUSTICE (1998); TEX.
DEFENDER SERV., LETHAL INDIFFERENCE: THE FATAL COMBINATION OF INCOMPETENT ATTORNEYS
AND UNACCOUNTABLE COURTS IN TEXAS DEATH PENALTY APPEALS (2002), available at
http://www.texasdefender.org/publications.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2005); Stephen B. Bright, Elected
Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full Habeas Corpus Review by Independent Federal
Judges is Indispensable To Protecting Constitutional Rights, 78 TFx. L. REV. 1805 (2000); Guy
Goldberg & Gena Bunn, Balancing Fairness & Finality: A Comprehensive Review of the Texas Death
Penalty, 5 TEX. REv. L & POL. 49 (2000); Rebecca Copeland, Comment, Getting it Right From the
Beginning: A Critical Examination of Current Criminal Defense in Texas and Proposal for a Statewide
Public Defender System, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 493 (2001).
110. See MARQUART ET AL., supra note 61, at 135; Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, supra note 62.
111. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Executed Offenders, at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/
executedoffenders.htm (last updated Apr. 21, 2005).
112. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Executions-December 7, 1982 through April 20, 2005, at
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/annual.htm (last updated Apr. 20, 2005).
113. Amnesty Int'l, Executions in the United States by State, at http://www.amnestyusa.org/
abolish/listbystate.do (last updated Apr. 26, 2005).
114. Id.
115. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, supra note 112.
116. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., State by State Information, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
state (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
117. More specifically, in 2000, Texas's forty executions accounted for forty-seven percent of the
nation's total eighty-five executions; in 2001, Texas's seventeen executions accounted for twenty-six
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According to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, as of April 21,
2005, there were 445 individuals on death row in Texas. 118 Of this number, 180
(40.4 percent) were African-American, 135 (30.3 percent) were white, 125
(28.1 percent) were Hispanic, and 5 (1.1 percent) were categorized as
"other."' 19 Only nine of the current 444 death row inmates were female. 20
Significantly, twenty-six of these individuals were not U.S. citizens, and
sixteen of them were citizens of Mexico. 12 Thus, Mexican nationals account
for sixty-two percent of the current Texas death row inmates who are not U.S.
citizens.
E. The Current Requirements for a Sentence of Death in Texas
Texas death penalty trials are "bifurcated" into two phases: a
"guilt/innocence phase" and a "sentencing phase."'122 In Texas, once a person
has been convicted of a "capital offense,"' 23 the trial proceeds to the sentencing
phase. 124 In the case of a defendant convicted of a "capital felony" for whom
the prosecutor is not seeking the death penalty, state law requires that "the
judge shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment."'' 25 Thus, those cases
never actually enter the "sentencing phase," illustrating the immense power that
percent of the nation's total sixty-six executions; in 2002, Texas's thirty-three executions accounted for
forty-six percent of the nation's seventy-one total executions; in 2003, Texas's twenty-four executions
accounted for thirty-seven percent of the nation's sixty-five total executions; and in 2004, Texas's
twenty-three executions accounted for thirty-nine percent of the nation's total executions. See Amnesty
Int'l, Executions in the USA Since 76, at http://www.amnestyusa.org/abolish/listbyyear.do (last updated
Apr. 26, 2005).
118. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Gender and Racial Statistics of Death Row Offenders, at
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/racial.htm (last updated Apr. 21, 2005).
119. Id. One of the more interesting features of the Texas death row population is the
disproportionate representation of individuals from Harris County (Houston). As of April 21, 2005, 159
of the 445 individuals on Texas death row (nearly thirty-six percent) are from Harris County, which is
one of more than 220 counties in the state. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, County of Conviction for
Offenders on Death Row, at http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/countyconviction.htm (last modified Apr.
21, 2005). In 2004, there were calls for a moratorium of the death penalty for cases coming from Harris
County because of problems with its crime lab. See, e.g., Editorial, Judiciary Should Delay Harris
Execution Dates, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Oct. 9, 2004, at lOB.
120. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, supra note 118.
121. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Citizenship of Offenders on Death Row, at
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/nationalities.htm (last updated Feb. 18, 2003).
122. TEXAS CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (Vernon 2004); see also TEX. DEFENDER SERV.,
supra note 64, at 1-3.
123. The Texas Penal Code defines a "capital murder" to include (i) the murder of a peace officer
or firefighter killed in the line of duty; (ii) a murder committed in the course of a kidnapping, burglary,
robbery, aggravated sexual assault, arson, obstruction or retaliation, or terroristic threat; (iii) a murder
for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or employing another for the same; (iv) a murder
committed while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal institution; (v) a murder committed
while incarcerated if serving a life sentence or if the victim was employed by the penal institution; (vi)
the murder of more than one person; and, finally, (vii) a murder where the victim is a child under the age
of six. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vemon 2004).
124. See TEXAS CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071(2)(a)(1) (Vernon 2004).
125. Id. § 37.071(1).
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the prosecutor wields in determining who does and does not get the death
penalty. If the prosecutor is seeking the death penalty, the jury is required to
answer the modem "special issues,"'126 which are revised and revamped from
the original "special issues" enacted in 1973. The current procedure is the same
as that discussed above in Section II.C.
A death sentence is automatically appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals,' 27 the court of last resort for criminal matters in the State. The
defendant may also seek habeas corpus relief in both state and 
federal courts. 12 8
As one source noted:
Post-conviction review is [the] crucial . . method of ensuring that capital trials are
fair and that death sentences are appropriate. It is a proceeding intended to prevent
wrongful executions, to find any new evidence proving innocence and to root out
cases of prosecutorial misconduct, shoddy 2police work, mistaken eye-witnesses,
false confessions and sleeping trial lawyers.
However, current chances for meaningful review or reversal of a Texas death
sentence are slim to non-existent. Indeed, one study found that "[t]hough two
out of three capital cases nationwide are overturned for error[,] the reversal rate
in Texas since 1995 approaches zero." 130 Unsurprisingly, critics have roundly
attacked the post-conviction process. After conducting a major study of the
post-conviction process in state proceedings, the Texas Defender Service found
that "an intolerably high number of people are being propelled through the state
habeas process with unqualified attorneys and an indifferent [Texas] Court of
Criminal Appeals." 131 It declared: "The habeas process in Texas, intended as a
vital safety net to catch mistakes, is instead a failed 
experiment."' ' 3
2
All sixteen of the Texas Avena cases are situated against this complex and
deeply troubled system of post-conviction review.
33 In several of the sixteen
126. Id. § 37.071(2) (b)(e).
127. Id. § 37.071(h).
128. See TEX. DEFENDER SERV., supra note 64, at 3.
129. TEX. DEFENDER SERV., supra note 109, at xiv, available at
http://www.texasdefender.org/front.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
130. Id. The study continues: "The [Texas Court of Criminal Appeals] reversed only eight of the
270 death sentences it reviewed on direct appeal between 1995 and 2000-the lowest reversal rate of
any state. Prior to 1995, Texas reversed about one-third of all the death punishments." Id.
131. Id. atvii-viii.
132. Id.; see also James C. Harrington & Anne More Burnham, Texas's New Habeas Corpus
Procedure for Death-Row Inmates: Kaflaesque-And Probably Unconstitutional, 27 ST. MARY'S L. J.
69(1995).
133. The sixteen Mexican nationals on death row in Texas who were the subject of the Avena
decision are (1) Juan Carlos Alvarez, (2) Cdsar Roberto Fierro Reyna, (3) Hector Garcia Torres, (4)
Ignacio G6mez, (5) Ramiro Hemindez Llanas, (6)Ramiro Rubi Ibarra, (7) Humberto Leal Garcia, (8)
Virgilio Maldonado, (9) Angel Maturino Resendiz, (10) Jose Emesto Medillin Rojas, (11) Roberto
Moreno Ramos, (12) Daniel Angel Plata Estrada, (13) Rubdn Ramirez Cardenas, (14) Felix Rocha Diaz,
(15) Oswaldo Regalado Soriano, and (16) Edgar Arias Tamayo. In both its Application Instituting
Proceedings and its Memorial submitted to the World Court in the Avena case, Mexico provides an
excellent summary of the factual, procedural, and historical background of the cases at issue. See
Mexico's Application Instituting Proceedings, supra note 33, at 25-34 (discussing all sixteen cases from
Texas); Memorial of Mexico at 41-44 (Chapter III), 93-95 (Chapter IV), Avena and Other Mexican
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cases, state and federal courts have already, in reported decisions, rejected the
defendants' efforts to raise the issue of the Vienna Convention. 34 In light of the
Avena decision and the demands of federal officials, it is incumbent upon
Texas officials to provide the required "review and reconsideration" of these
cases.
111. THE VIENNA CONVENTION AND THE AVENA DECISION
Governments brought consular officials onto the diplomatic scene to
provide governmental representation in commercial and individual matters in
foreign countries, and to handle other matters of national interest that might not
rise to the level of matters of state.' 35 Because the consular function is not
limited to matters of state, consulates are usually placed regionally in receiving
states to support the economic and personal interests of visitors from the
sending state.1
36
The Vienna Convention entered into force in 1963, and the United States
joined the treaty in 1969.137 During the drafting and negotiating period, Article
36, dealing with consular information and notification, arguably received the
most attention and caused the most controversy. 138 The issues dominating the
debate included whether
(1) a sending state should be informed of the arrest of one of its nationals,
irrespective of the individual's wishes; (2) as a matter of principle, when an alien
enters a country, she has accepted its jurisdiction and cannot then claim a greater
degree of protection than nationals of the host nation; and (3) notification would
create an excessive administrative burden upon those countries with a great deal of
alien immigration. 
13 9
Ultimately the drafters agreed with the United States delegation that "no
country could disregard its obligation in certain circumstances to inform
consuls of the sending state of the arrest of its nationals.' 140 This was, as a U.S.
delegate explained, intended "to protect the rights of the national
concerned."14 1 Compromise language, offered by the United Kingdom,
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. I (Mar. 31) (No. 128) (discussing particular difficulties and
challenges faced by defendants Cdsar Roberto, Fierro Reyna, and Ramiro Rubi Ibarra, respectively), at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iimusimuspleadings/imus-ipleadings-toc.htm (last visited Apr.
26, 2005).
134. See Mexico's Application Instituting Proceedings, supra note 33, at 25-34.
135. Fleischman, supra note 53, at 361.
136. Id.
137. Vienna Convention, supra note 2.
138. See generally Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention of Consular Relations: A
Search for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 569 (1997).
139. Fleischman, supra note 53, at 364.
140. Id. at 364-65.
141. United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 73 (1st Cir. 2000) (Torruella, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (alteration in original) (citing 1 UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON CONSULAR
RELATIONS: OFFICIAL RECORDS at 337, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 25/6, U.N. Sales No. 63.X.2 (1963)).
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eventually became the text of Article 36.142
The United States acknowledges in its regulations its responsibility under
the Convention to notify consular officials when federal law enforcement
officials make arrests of foreign nationals. 143 The U.S. government also
142. Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 2, states:
COMMUNICATION AND CONTACT WITH NATIONALS OF THE SENDING STATE
(1) With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the
sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and
to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom
with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending
State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay,
inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national
of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is
detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by
the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said
authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in
prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for
his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the
sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a
judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of
a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action.
(2) The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with
the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the
said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the
rights accorded under this Article are intended.
143. This regulation ("Notification of Consular Officers upon the arrest of foreign nationals") reads
in its entirety:
(a) This statement is designed to establish a uniform procedure for consular notification
where nationals of foreign countries are arrested by officers of this Department on
charges of criminal violations. It conforms to practice under international law and in
particular implements obligations undertaken by the United States pursuant to treaties
with respect to the arrest and detention of foreign nationals. Some of the treaties obligate
the United States to notify the consular officer only upon the demand or request of the
arrested foreign national. On the other hand, some of the treaties require notifying the
consul of the arrest of a foreign national whether or not the arrested person requests such
notification.
(1) In every case in which a foreign national is arrested the arresting officer shall inform
the foreign national that his consul will be advised of his arrest unless he does not wish
such notification to be given. If the foreign national does not wish to have his consul
notified, the arresting officer shall also inform him that in the event there is a treaty in
force between the United States and his country which requires such notification, his
consul must be notified regardless of his wishes and, if such is the case, he will be
advised of such notification by the U.S. Attorney.
(2) In all cases (including those where the foreign national has stated that he does not
wish his consul to be notified) the local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or
the local Marshal's office, as the case may be, shall inform the nearest U.S. Attorney
of the arrest and of the arrested person's wishes regarding consular notification.
(3) The U.S. Attorney shall then notify the appropriate consul except where he has been
informed that the foreign national does not desire such notification to be made.
However, if there is a treaty provision in effect which requires notification of consul,
without reference to a demand or request of the arrested national, the consul shall be
notified even if the arrested person has asked that he not be notified. In such case, the
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acknowledges that the responsibility extends to the states. 44 Consequently,
Mexico maintains an active program of legal consultation and defense through
its various consulates in the United States. 145 Nevertheless, sending countries,
including Mexico, have found it difficult to obtain remedies for imprisoned
foreign nationals, particularly in death penalty cases, through the U.S. court
system. Although it is impossible to tell how many cases involving foreign
nationals are handled in compliance with the Vienna Convention, it is fair to
146say that a significant number, including death penalty cases, are not.
A. Treatment of the Vienna Convention by U.S. Courts
U.S. criminal courts have been adamant and uniform in their position that
violations of the Vienna Convention cannot be remedied in criminal cases. A
simple search of the Lexis/Nexis database on February 17, 2005, using
keywords "Article 36" and "Vienna Convention on Consular Relations" yields
202 results, including interlocutory, procedural, and final decisions, as well as
civil cases stemming from the arrests of foreign nationals. 147 Of those,
defendants received relief in only two cases, once in the form of suppression of
evidence, 4 8 and once where a conviction was reversed and remanded due to
the ineffective assistance of counsel, which was based in part on counsel's
failure to inform the defendant of his rights under the Vienna Convention. 49
The courts give several reasons for their general reluctance to provide relief,
some of which seem contrived, and all of which betray a distinct discomfort
with international law playing a role in the U.S. system of criminal justice.
U.S. Attorney shall advise the foreign national that his consul has been notified and
inform him that notification was necessary because of the treaty obligation.
(b) The procedure prescribed by this statement shall not apply to cases involving arrests
made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in administrative expulsion or
exclusion proceedings, since that Service has heretofore established procedures for the
direct notification of the appropriate consular officer upon such arrest. With respect to
arrests made by the Service for violations of the criminal provisions of the immigration
laws, the U.S. Marshal, upon delivery of the foreign national into his custody, shall be
responsible for informing the U.S. Attorney of the arrest in accordance with numbered
paragraph 2 of this statement.
28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (2005).
144. See Counter-Memorial of the United States of America 124, LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001
I.C.J. 466 (June 21) (No. 104), at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/iguspleadings/
iGUSipleadingCounterMemorialUS_20000327.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
145. See Memorial of Mexico, supra note 133, at 11 (Chapter Ii).
146. This claim is necessarily speculative, but it is based on the fact that the Avena case has 54
examples of violations that were actually discovered. It is likely that many more violations involving
nationals from other countries go unreported.
147. Results on file with the authors.
148. State v. Reyes, No Number in Original, 1999 Del. Super. LEXIS 353 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 17,
1999).
149. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134 (Iowa 2001).
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1. Procedural Default
Procedural default refers to the situation in which a criminal defendant fails
to raise issues relevant to his or her defense at the appropriate time, as
proscribed by the rules of the jurisdiction (state or federal) in which he or she is
being tried.1 50 In consular notification cases, authorities typically fail to inform
the foreign national, upon arrest, that the Vienna Convention provides him the
right to contact a consulate. Later, usually during appeals or habeas corpus
proceedings (frequently with a new lawyer), the defendant will discover the
Vienna Convention. Understandably, the defendant desires that courts consider
the issue because, like Miranda rights,151 access to a consulate's staff could
have assisted the defendant's defense in many ways; a ruling that the failure to
notify violated the defendant's legal rights could conceivably result in a
reversal of the guilty verdict-or at least a new trial. 52 However, when
defendants' lawyers attempt to raise the issue before an appellate court, the
court typically uses the procedural default rule to bar consideration of the
issue.'
53
2. No Individual Rights Created by the Vienna Convention
In this line of cases, courts have accepted evidence of a Vienna Convention
violation-or the United States or a state have conceded the violation-but
have nevertheless denied relief, claiming that the Vienna Convention provides
relief only to nation-states, not individuals.' 54 Courts provide two grounds for
this conclusion. First, they have looked to the Preamble of the Vienna
Convention, which states that "the purpose of such privileges and immunities is
not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of functions
by consular posts on behalf of their respective states."' 55 This language has
been read to mean that consular privileges, and not individual privileges,
constitute the sole purpose of the convention.1 56 Second, courts have given
150. See Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to
Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 203,
225 (1998).
151. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
152. Indeed, this is the exact argument and form of remedy that Mexico sought in the Avena case.
See Mexico's Application Instituting Proceedings, supra note 33, at 2, 42-45; Memorial of Mexico,
supra note 133, at 5-6 (Chapter I), 146-73 (Chapter VI).
153. See, e.g., Torres v. Mullins, 540 U.S. 1035 (2003); Villagomez v. Sternes, 88 Fed. Appx. 100
(7th Cir. 2004) (unpublished opinion); Bieregu v. Ashcroft, 259 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D.N.J. 2003).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Erdil, 230 F.
Supp. 2d 292 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Murgas v. United States, No. 99-CV-1723, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6277
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2002).
155. Vienna Convention, supra note 2.
156. See, e.g., Li, 206 F.3d at 66 (Selya, J., concurring):
Of course, there are references in the [treaty] to a "right" of [consular] access, but these
references are easily explainable. The contracting States are granting each other rights, and
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substantial weight to the State Department's pronouncements on these matters.
Since the 1970s, the State Department's consistent position has been that "the
Vienna Convention will [not] require significant departures from the existing
practice within the several states of the United States."'' 57 The Department
claims that no other signatory state remedies violations through its criminal
justice system, suggesting that the United States need not do so either.' 58
3. Rights Under the Vienna Convention Do Not Rise to the Level of
Fundamental Rights
In several cases, defendants sought to use the exclusionary rule to suppress
evidence after the authorities failed to inform them of the accessibility of
consulate assistance. 159 The defendants have not been successful. Many courts
see the right to notify one's consulate upon arrest as a courtesy; they do not
view it as rising to the level of the fundamental rights typically protected in the
American criminal justice system. 160 Courts often base their denials on U.S.
constitutional law and other U.S. caselaw. However, the cases they invoke
typically involve U.S. citizens, not foreign nationals, which means they are
unlikely to give due weight to the critical role that consular access may play, in
similar situations, for foreign nationals.' 6 1 The courts' use of precedent assures
that the exclusionary rule will never be an appropriate remedy for a defendant
from another country who is not informed of the availability of consular
telling future detainees that they have a "right" to communicate with their consul is a means of
implementing the treaty obligations as between States. Any other way of phrasing the promise
as to what will be said to detainees would be both artificial and awkward.
157. Id. at 64 (opinion of the court) (quoting a letter from the Department of State to all fifty state
governors after the Vienna Convention's ratification in 1970).
158. Id. at 65 (citing Department of State Answers to the Questions Posed by the First Circuit).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda, 57 Fed. Appx. 4 (1st Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion);
United States v. Duarte-Acevo, 296 F.3d 1277 (11 th Cir. 2002); United States v. Carrillo, 269 F.3d 761
(7th Cir. 2001); United States v. De Le Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting a strong
presumption against inferring private rights); United States v. Emueghuan, 2001 FED App. 0358P, 268
F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Minjares-Alvares, 264 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that even if individual rights are at issue, "suppression is not the appropriate remedy");
United States v. Page, 2000 FED App. 0388P, 232 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2000); Jiminez v. Dretke, No.
3:02-CV-1716-M, 2004 WL 789809 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2004); United States v. Espinoza-Aguiree, No.
3:02-CV-1447-H, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19690 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2003); United States v. Mandujano,
No. CR. 03-178(2)JRTFLN, 2003 WL 22076571 (D. Minn. Aug. 22, 2003); United States v. Garcia-
Meza, No. 1:02-CR-56, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8318, at *12 (W.D. Mich. May 6, 2003) (noting that the
Convention implies some rights but it does not explain how to enforce them); United States v. Agboola,
No. 00-100 (JRT/FLN), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25776, at *16-*20 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 2002) (finding no
private rights, and stating that even if there were private rights, prejudice must be shown).
160. Cf Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
161. The Supreme Court has struggled for generations to determine the content of the liberties, in
addition to those enumerated in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, that are included within the
concept of "due process." At first, moderation and conservatism resulted in the "incorporation" of few
rights into the concept of due process, especially in the criminal context. Eventually, the list grew to
include most of the Bill of Rights. But the Court never had the occasion to review rights unique to
foreign individuals. The fact that the notion of fundamental rights developed in this domestic vacuum
does not necessarily exclude rights unique to foreigners such as consular notification.
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assistance from his home country.
In marked contrast to the decisions of U.S. courts, an advisory opinion by
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, requested by the Mexican
government in a case preceding Avena, found that the consular notification
provision of the Vienna Convention is both an individual right and a minimal
guarantee of international human rights law.' 62 The Inter-American court based
this conclusion on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.'
63
The Covenant 164 recognizes the concept of due process of law, and it
enumerates a list of rights of criminal defendants which coincides closely with
fundamental rights in criminal cases under the United States Constitution.
165
162. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the
Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 16 (1999) [hereinafter
Inter-American Court Advisory Opinion on Consular Assistance], available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/serieapdf ing/seriea-l 6_ing.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
163. Id. at 54-60.
164. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6319
(1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
165. Id. art. 14:
(1) All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of
any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law,
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The press and the public
may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, public order
(ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of
the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the
interests of justice; but any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at
law shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise
requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of
children.
(2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law.
(3) In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail in a language which he understands
of the nature and cause of the charge against him;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defense and to
communicate with counsel of his own choosing
(c) To be tried without undue delay;
(d) To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through legal
assistance of his own choosing; to be informed, if he does not have legal
assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance assigned to him, in any
case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment by him in
any such case if he does not have sufficient means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him;
(f) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak
the language used in court;
(a) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt.
(g) In the case of juvenile persons, the procedure shall be such as will take
account of their age and the desirability of promoting their rehabilitation.
(h) Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to his conviction and
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Under such a due process regime, the court reasoned:
[I]t is obvious that notification of one's right to contact the consular agent of one's
country will considerably enhance one's chances of defending oneself and the
proceedings conducted in the respective cases, including the police investigations,
are more likely to be carried in accord with the law and with respect for the dignity166
of the human person.
To the Inter-American court, then, consular notification is the key that unlocks
all of the recognized due process rights, and, as such, is itself a fundamental
due process right .167
sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal according to law.
(i) When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence
and when subsequently his conviction has been reversed or he has been
pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows
conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has
suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated
according to law, unless it is proved that the non-disclosure of the unknown
fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him.
(j) No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which
he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the
law and penal procedure of each country.
166. Inter-American Court Advisory Opinion on Consular Assistance, supra note 162, at 60.
167. The Inter-American Court stated that the seriousness of death as a penalty
translates into the internationally recognized principle whereby those States that still have the
death penalty must, without exception, exercise the most rigorous control for observance of
judicial guarantees in these cases. It is obvious that the obligation to observe the right to
information becomes all the more imperative here, given the exceptionally grave and
irreparable nature of the penalty that one sentenced to death could receive.
Id. at 63.
The Mexican government pled on several different grounds that the United States was in violation of
its obligations under the Vienna Convention. Though the opinion was advisory, the court limited its
discussion of remedy to the remedy that would obtain between nation-states, specifically, "those
pertaining to the international responsibility of the state and the duty to make reparations." Id.
Because an individual remedy was not contemplated by the court, it might be argued that the rights
dealt with in the opinion might not be quite so individualized as the court claimed. Another reason to be
skeptical of the opinion and its use of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is best
described by the U.S. Supreme Court in a recent decision: "[A]lthough the Covenant does bind the
United States as a matter of international law, the United States [Senate] ratified the Covenant on the
express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable
in the federal courts." Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2767 (2004) (citing 138 CONG. REC.
8071 (1992)). The status of the Covenant would also exclude obligations litigated in state courts.
The Inter-American Court attempted to address this issue implicitly by noting that the principle is
recognized in other inter-American and universal instruments; without stating as much, the Court's
implication was that the principle had reached the status of customary law. See Inter-American Court
Advisory Opinion on Consular Assistance, supra note 162, at 63. However, the Court's evidence of
custom was weak. It referenced the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish
the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 1042, Organization of American States, 20th Sess., O.A.S. T.S. No. 73, 29
I.L.M. 1447 (1990), and the United Nations Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those
Facing the Death Penalty, E.S.C. Res. 1984/50, U.N. ESCOR, Supp. No. 1, at 33, U.N. Doc. E/1984/84
(1984). Id. at 63 nn.95-96. However, the dominant view is that resolutions of inter-governmental bodies
do not constitute law in a legislative sense and that more would be required than a couple of resolutions
to evidence the necessary opiniojuris required to establish the existence of custom.
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B. The Avena Decision. Background and Meaning
Deeply frustrated, the Mexican government left the U.S. court system for
the international system, searching for more favorable consideration of its legal
position. It was not the first country to do so. Two cases involving the United
States and Article 36 preceded Avena to the ICJ. The first, Paraguay v. United
States, was filed and withdrawn after the Paraguayan prisoner, Angel Breard,
was executed in Virginia in April of 1998. The second, Germany v. United
States, resulted in an opinion which was crucial in the ICJ's opinion in Avena.
1. Paraguay v. United States (Breard)
The state of Virginia convicted Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan
citizen, of murder in 1993, and sentenced him to death. 168 The Virginia
Supreme Court upheld the conviction. 169 After filing a motion for habeas
corpus in federal court, Breard raised Article 36 concerns for the first time;
local law enforcement officials, he claimed, failed to inform him of his right to
notify Paraguay's regional consular officials of his arrest. 170 Breard claimed
that he was thus deprived of the opportunity to receive advice that would have
led him to plead guilty, thereby avoiding the death penalty. 171 Both the district
court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the claim.' 72 The U.S.
Supreme Court heard the case April 14, 1998-the day of his scheduled
execution. Paraguay had instituted proceedings before the ICJ on April 3, and
on April 9, the ICJ had noted jurisdiction and issued an order stating:
The United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel
Francisco Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings,
and should inform the Court of all the measures which it has taken in
implementation of this Order.
173
The ICJ order notwithstanding, the Supreme Court declined to issue an
order staying the execution so that it could consider the merits of Breard's
claim. 174 The Court, in a per curiam opinion, provided two bases for its
decision: first, because Breard did not assert his Vienna Convention claim in
168. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 372 (1998) (per curiam).
169. Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1994).
170. Breard, 523 U.S. at 373.
171. Id. at 377. It should be noted that Breard did admit to the killing of a Virginia woman and
claimed that the murder was brought on by Satanic influences. Breard's argument amounted to a claim
that given his admission, he might have fared better had he been advised to plead in a manner consistent
with the admission.
172. The habeas petition was rejected at the district court level in Breard v. Netherland, 949 F.
Supp. 1255 (E.D. Va. 1996), and by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d
615 (4th Cir. 1998).
173. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 258 (Order of Apr.
9 on Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausorder/ipausiorder_090498.HTM (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
174. Breard, 523 U.S. at 378-79.
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state court, as required by federal and state law, he could not raise the claim on
federal habeas review; second, the subsequently enacted Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) 175 prevented him from showing that the
treaty violation prejudiced his rights. 176 The Court held that the Vienna
Convention, as a treaty, stands on full parity with legislation, and that the "later
in time" rule, which gives pre-emptive force to the most recent legislation
where conflict occurs, applied. The AEDPA in effect codified procedural
default for parties first claiming violation of treaty rights at the habeas corpus
stage of proceedings. 177 Breard claimed that, had he been properly advised by
consular personnel, he would have pled guilty and accepted a life sentence,
rather than defending his not-guilty plea, but the Court found that claim too
speculative to be persuasive.' 78 Breard was executed later that night.
The dissenters, Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg, would have stayed
the execution in order to fully examine the substantive issues. Justice Breyer
noted that Breard claimed a viable excuse for not raising the issue earlier: the
issue presented was a novel one.' 79 Instead of allowing for a briefing on this
and other points, the Court-Justice Breyer argued-provided only a cursory
treatment of the issue of procedural default and U.S. obligations under the
Vienna Convention. To him, that is unfortunate, because the Court essentially
ignored the language that it quoted from the Vienna Convention.
180
Specifically, while the Convention does allow for its provisions to be carried
out in a manner that conforms to national law, it further states that "said laws
and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the
rights accorded under this Article are intended."'181 Thus, certain minimum
protections are mandatory under the Convention, regardless of applicable
national law, and preempting the Vienna Convention obligations under the
procedural default doctrine is a violation of the treaty. The Court majority erred
in its rush to judgment.'
82
The Supreme Court, however, may have provided some language helpful to
those seeking to incorporate Article 36 of the Vienna Convention into U.S.
criminal procedure: "The Vienna Convention... arguably confers on an
175. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (e)(2) (2004).
176. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
177. Id..
178. Id. at377.
179. Id. at 380-81.
180. Id. at 375.
181. Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(2).
182. Seven months after Breard's execution, the Republic of Paraguay requested that the ICJ allow
it to withdraw the case. On November 10, 1998, that request was granted. Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 426 (Discontinuance Order of Nov. 10), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausorder/ipaus_iorder_981110.htm (last visited Apr. 26,
2005).
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individual the right to consular assistance following arrest .. . ."183 This
language perhaps undermines the position, adopted by many courts, that the
Vienna Convention confers no individual rights.
2. Germany v. United States (LaGrand) 184
In 1984, Arizona tried and convicted German citizens Karl and Walter
LaGrand for first degree murder; they were sentenced to death. At the time of
the killing, the LaGrands had been living in the United States for more than a
decade, having arrived in the States as young children.185 According to the U.S.
memorial in the case, the LaGrands were, in speech and demeanor, Americans,
not Europeans. 186 Following their arrest, no one informed the LaGrands of the
Vienna Convention's provisions for consular notification and access.' 87 Indeed,
it was not until 1998 that anyone formally notified the LaGrands, though by
that time the matter was already the subject of appeals to overturn their death
sentences. 188 By 1995, the LaGrands had begun federal habeas corpus appeals
citing the failure of law enforcement officials to notify them of the provisions
of the Vienna Convention. The district court rejected the claim based on
procedural default, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and, in November 1998, the U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari.189
On February 24, 1999, following other legal maneuvers, Arizona executed
Karl LaGrand. On March 2, Germany instituted proceedings before the ICJ and
asked the to court take provisional measures to prevent the United States from
allowing Walter LaGrand's execution. The ICJ granted those measures on
March 3.190 Under the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction for state parties,
Germany also requested that the Court honor the ICJ's provisional measures by
granting a stay of the execution scheduled for that day. The Supreme Court
denied the stay, citing U.S. sovereign immunity, Eleventh Amendment state
sovereign immunity, and the tardiness of the German action.' 91
183. Breard, 523 U.S. at 376.
184. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igusijudgment_20010625.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
185. Id. at 475.
186. Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, supra note 144, 16.
187. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 466 at 475.
188. As noted in the Supreme Court opinion denying a stay of execution, the German government
learned of the LaGrand detentions and death penalty in 1992, seven years before it got involved in
litigation. Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 112 (1999).
189. LaGrand v. Lewis, 883 F. Supp. 451 (D. Ariz. 1995), affd sub nom. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133
F.3d 1253 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998).
190. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Order of Mar. 3 on Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusorder/
igus_iorder_19990303.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
191. Federal Republic of Germany, 526 U.S. at I 11. The Court's per curiam one-paragraph opinion
seethes with understated outrage over the suggestion that the Court is not the court of last resort over
matters in the United States. In fact, Germany had treated the ICJ as an appellate court, which rankled
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In ICJ proceedings following Walter LaGrand's execution, the United
States acknowledged that it violated the Convention, setting the stage for
discussion of the proper remedy. 192 Initially, the ICJ ruled that, under the
circumstances, the United States should have stayed the execution of Walter
LaGrand, in compliance with the ICJ's request for provisional measures.' 93 The
ICJ's authority for that request arose under Article 41 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.' 94 None of the United States' actions in the
LaGrand case-from the executive branch's non-committal communications to
the Arizona governor to its Supreme Court brief stating that the order of
provisional measures was not binding-fulfilled the country's obligation. In a
tacit acknowledgment of the limits of its authority, the ICJ stated that its order
was not result-oriented, but that it did expect the federal government to do
everything in its power to prevent the execution.'
95
One of Germany's main complaints was that the U.S. procedural default
rule obstructed any effective remedy in the case. The ICJ agreed that
procedural default prevented the United States from fulfilling its obligations to
give, under Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention, "full effect" to "the rights"
under Article 36(1). Though the Vienna Convention requires' the exercise of
rights "in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State," the
ICJ recognized (as the United States had urged) that such conformity was
subject "to the proviso ... that the said laws and regulations must enable full
effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
the Supreme Court. Germany's delay was rather extraordinary and no doubt also contributed to Court's
ire.
Of course, under international law, whenever the United States enters into a treaty with a dispute-
settlement provision, the country has in fact waived sovereign immunity, and there really is nothing in
U.S. constitutional law to dispute that position. This is not to say that national high courts are relegated
to the position of intermediate appellate courts (unless done so explicitly, as in the case of the European
Union, where national high courts are, for certain matters, intermediate courts). The statement in the per
curiam was an unfortunate gaffe done in the heat of the moment.
192. The United States acknowledged the violation in its Memorial:
The United States of America bears responsibility for such non-performance of U.S.
obligations under the Convention by Arizona. Accordingly, the United States acknowledges
that, as a result of the failure to inform Walter and Karl LaGrand of their right to consular
notification, there was a breach of a legal duty owed by the United States to the Federal
Republic of Germany under the Vienna Convention.
Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, supra note 144, 1 6.
193. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 516 (June 27).
194. Article 41 provides, in relevant part:
I. The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require,
any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of
either party.
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to
the parties and to the Security Council.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 41, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. The
ICJ acknowledged an inconsistency between the English and French text of the provision, but found
Article 41 mandatory in light of its purpose. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 502-06.
195. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 506-08.
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Article are intended., 196 Because the procedural default rule blocked
consideration of the evidence of the Vienna Convention violation, the ICJ, in
contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court, ruled that the Vienna Convention violation
had, in fact, prevented Germany from assisting the LaGrands much earlier in
their case.
19 7
Germany further asked the ICJ to rule that the United States undergo
significant legal and practical reform to prevent future violations of Article
36.198 The United States objected to the request for a mandatory guarantee,
199
and the ICJ did not fully accept the German position.200 The ICJ did point out
that the United States had an obligation to prevent such violations in the future,
while acknowledging that "the choice of means must be left to the United
States.""'
3. Mexico v. United States (Avena)
The Avena case culminated from a series of events that deeply frustrated
the Mexican government. Mexico, which maintains an extensive consular
system designed to assist Mexican nationals, 20 2 had successfully defended its
nationals in U.S. courts on several occasions. 20 3 Yet, following executions of
three Mexican nationals in cases involving the failure to notify of the right to
consular access, 204 Mexico took its case to the international stage. It first
brought the general issue of Article 36 notification and access provisions to the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
205
The 1999 Inter-American decision gave Mexico the intellectual high ground
but it did not produce tangible results; dozens of Mexican nationals who had
not received notice of their rights to contact the consulate remained in U.S.
prisons. Fifty-two of them faced the death penalty for murder convictions. 206 In
196. 2001 I.C.J. at 497 (quoting Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 36(2)). The United States
argued that the "in conformity" and "full effect" language of Article 36(2) applied only to matters
dealing with the "rights" of consular officials under Article 36(i) and not to criminal procedures
pertaining to "individual rights." Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, supra note 144, IM
78-81. This is at odds with the position of the Supreme Court in Breard. which declared procedural
default to be one of the rules to which the "rights" of 36(1) had to conform (while ignoring the full-
effect portion). Breard v. United States 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998).
197. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 497-98.
198. Id. at 471-74.
199. Id. at 509-10.
200. 1d. at512-13.
201. Id. at 513.
202. See Fleischman, supra note 53, at 366 (quoting from an affidavit by a former Mexican civil
servant).
203. See id. at 368-374.
204. Montoya v. State, 810 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Montoya v. State, 744 S.W.2d 15
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Murphy v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d 48 (Va. 1993).
205. See supra notes 162-167and accompanying text.
206. Mexico originally submitted its filings before the ICJ on behalf of fifty-four individuals. This
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January 2003, Mexico brought suit against the United States in the ICJ, for
systemic violations of U.S. obligations under Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention.
The United States defended itself differently in Avena than it did in
LaGrand. In particular, the United States would not concede that, in each of the
contested cases, it had violated Article 36. Instead, the United States mounted
its defense on several different grounds. First, it characterized the
circumstances of the cases as diverse, and suggested that it had acted
appropriately in light of the facts of each case.207 Because consular officials
serve in part as a cultural bridge for the detainee, 208 the United States argued
that when a detainee had spent significant time in the United States, it is hard to
measure the usefulness of this part of the consular duties. "[A]t least forty-six
of the fifty-four cases before the Court" involved detainees who had spent
significant time in the United States.20 9 Additionally, the United States argued
that the consular officer role in providing legal assistance is described as
optional (which it is),2  and that detainees have the right to reject consular
notification.2 11 In its attempt to use the sheer number of cases and
circumstances as a defense, the United States further asserted that there is no
general obligation to involve consular officials at the beginning of an arrest and
investigation.
212
Second, the United States sought to define the term "without delay" in its
notification obligation to mean "as soon as reasonably possible under the
circumstances. ' 213 Without clearly specifying what law enforcement behavior it
was defending, the United States sought to undercut the Mexican claim that the
obligation to inform foreign nationals "without delay" meant immediately after
arrest and prior to the beginning of the investigative process-at a time similar
to the Miranda warnings.
Mexico also claimed that various aspects of U.S. criminal procedure
prevented the nation's courts from hearing Vienna Convention claims. The
figure was subsequently changed to fifty-two during oral proceedings. See Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1, 14 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imus-imusjudgment_20040331.pdf (last visited Apr. 26,
2005).
207. Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, supra note 51, at 69-78 (Chapter VI).
208. Id. at 70-71.
209. Id. The United States also claimed that a significant portion of the fifty-two parties in the suit
were American nationals or dual nationals. Because the United States could not furnish precise
information establishing American nationality of several of the fifty-two individuals, the Court
maintained the presumption of Mexican nationality for all fifty-two. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 1, 57.
210. Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, supra note 51, at 73-74 (Chapter VI).
211. Id. at 74-75.
212. Id. at 74-76.
213. Id. at 79-81. Conceivably, the United States could distinguish the cases at issue in Avena from
LaGrand, where the United States did not officially inform the LaGrands of their rights until 1998,
fourteen years after their convictions.
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United States responded that it complied with the ICJ's LaGrand decision in
that LaGrand left review and reconsideration of such claims to a method of the
United States's "own choosing."214 The United States argued that the clemency
process of review and reconsideraion in the various states gave full effect to
215Article 36. It was surprising that the United States relied on judicial appeals
and clemency processes in its Avena memorial, because the ICJ had considered
those procedures in LaGrand and found them wanting.21 6 The United States
also proposed that if the ICJ ultimately found it to be in violation, it should be
allowed to conduct review and reconsideration of the cases through its own
system and not have to vacate, apply the exclusionary rule, or provide other
guarantees requested by Mexico.
2 17
The ICJ ultimately ruled in favor of Mexico. With respect to the Mexican
nationals involved, the court found that the United States violated paragraphs
l(a), 1(b), and 1(c) of Article 36 both by failing to inform detainees of their
rights and by failing to notify Mexican consulates of the detentions. 211 The ICJ
reasoned that the three sections of Article 36(1), addressing rights of access,
notification and information, and visitation, respectively, should be interpreted
together when considering detainees rights.219 The ICJ also held that the United
States should provide consular notification "once it is realized that the person is
a foreign national., 220 Because of the United States' highly ethnically diverse
population, the court suggested that officials request nationality identification
upon detention, in a manner paralleling the "Miranda Rule"--a practice that the
ICJ noted already exists in several U.S. jurisdictions.
221
The ICJ also determined that the United States had failed to undertake the
procedural default reforms that it ordered in LaGrand.222 The court, echoing
LaGrand, argued that the procedural default rule prevented Article 36 from
having full effect within the United States, as required under paragraph 2, by
preventing defendants from raising Article 36 claims at various points during
criminal proceedings. 223 Yet, because judicial procedures were still ongoing in
most of the cases, the ICJ did not find that the procedural default rule had
214. Id. at 105-06.
215. Id. at 112-14. Mexico characterized the process as ineffectively responsive to Convention
claims. Memorial of Mexico, supra note 133, at 87 (Chapter IV).
216. See supra notes 192-197 and accompanying text.
217. The United States argued that the rights outlined in Article 36 were not fundamental due
process rights that would, under U.S. practice, merit "exclusion of statements from use in evidence for a
breach of Article 36." Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, supra note 207, at 129-30
(Chapter VI).
218. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J 1, 106 (Mar. 31).
219. Id. 161.
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already caused a violation, stating that it would be premature to do SO. 2 24 It
therefore denied Mexico's request for annulment of all contested convictions
and exclusion of evidence, and guarantees, through reform, that the violations
of Article 36 would cease. The court also declined to hold that Article 36 rights
constituted fundamental rights that necessitated the exclusion of evidence
resulting from their violation, 225 because nothing in the travaux pr~paratoires
of the Vienna Convention indicated that they were.226 However, in three of the
cases at issue, including that of Osbaldo Torres, for whom Oklahoma had
already set an execution date, the court held that the use of the procedural
default rule violated Article 36(2)'s full-effect requirement. 27
For the most part, what the ICJ did was clarify or perhaps simply restate its
decision in LaGrand. It explained that "review and reconsideration" as defined
in LaGrand would be an effective remedy in the instant case. As such, the ICJ
held that the United States should consider fully the violations of the Vienna
Convention and "guarantee that the violation and the possible prejudice caused
by that violation will be fully examined and taken into account in the review
and reconsideration process.' '228 Also, according to the court, "review and
reconsideration should be both of the sentence and of the conviction., 229 The
ICJ rejected the U.S. position that clemency proceedings, which typically
involve the executive branch, fulfilled its obligation under the Vienna
Convention as interpreted by the LaGrand decision, declaring that "it is the
judicial process that is suited to this task. '230 The ICJ's decision was directed to
the United States, but, as will be explained later, is imputable to the states
under federalism and foreign policy principles in the U.S. Constitution.23'
The ICJ's decision has had an effect on the cases at issue in the litigation-
including the sixteen cases from Texas. In addition to the Medellin case, an
Oklahoma case received significant attention as a result of the position taken by
the governor and the top criminal court in that state. The case of Osbaldo
Torres was one of the three cases in which the ICJ held that the United States
had failed to provide review and reconsideration. Torres was scheduled to die
on May 18, 2004.232 On May 13, 2004, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals granted a stay of execution and remanded the case for evidentiary
hearing to determine "(a) whether Torres was prejudiced by the State's








231. See infra Section V.B.
232. See Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (on file with author).
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was detained, that he had the right to contact the Mexican consulate; and (b)
ineffective assistance of counsel. 23 3 On that same day, Governor Brad Henry
granted Torres clemency for the murders of Francisco Morales and Maria
Yanez, following the recommendation of the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole
Board.234
Significantly, both Governor Henry and Susan B. Loving, the Chairperson
of the Pardon and Parole Board, received letters from the Legal Advisor of the
U.S. Department of State, William H. Taft IV.235 Both letters explained the ICJ
decision and its remedy. Mr. Taft requested that the Board and the governor
"give particular attention to the representations of the Government of Mexico
on Mr. Torres' behalf.,23 6 While the State Department has not stated
categorically that it views the ICJ decision binding on Oklahoma, its
suggestions in the Torres case were strong ones couched in careful diplomatic
terms.
The Torres case may provide a roadmap for the future. States wishing to
heed the judgment of the ICJ can, through their court systems, order review and
reconsideration hearings to determine whether a defendant was harmed by the
failure to provide consular notification and access under the Vienna
Convention. The ICJ did explain that state clemency proceedings were
insufficient to fulfill the requirement. However, in the Torres, the state
appellate court had ordered an evidentiary hearing before the governor
commuted the death sentence to life. Whether or when retrial may be required
in future cases remains an open question. But review and reconsideration does
place the issue back into the hands of state justice systems, which must adopt
adequate measures to deal with any conviction and sentencing errors
attributable to violations of the Convention.
4. Medellin v. Dretke
The case of Medellin v. Dretke2 37 typifies in many respects the death
penalty cases at issue in Avena. It involves violent and heartbreaking killings,
specifically, the rape and murder of teenage girls as part of a gang ritual.238 The
233. Id.
234. Press Release, Office of the Governor of Oklahoma, Governor Henry Grants Clemency to
Death Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.governor.state.ok.us/
displayarticle.php?article id=301&article_type=1 (last visited Apr. 24, 2005).
235. Letter from William H. Taft IV, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, to Susan B. Loving,
Chairperson, Oklahoma Parole Board (May 11, 2004), and to Brad Henry, Governor of Oklahoma (Apr.
23, 2004) (on file with authors).
236. Id.
237. 371 F.3d 270 (2004), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 686 (2004).
238. Too often, "scholarly debates" over criminal-justice issues lose sight of the actual
circumstances of the cases. It is important to recall why Medellin was arrested in the first place:
Charged with capital murder and held without bond were:... Jose Ernesto Medellin, 18 ....
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defendant did not receive advice regarding consular assistance during the early
years of his case. In fact, the Mexican government did not learn of Medellin
until several years after his conviction and death sentence. Medellin sought a
writ of habeas corpus from federal district court that was denied. His appeal to
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was similarly denied.24° Medellin then
requested a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted in December
2004.241
The Supreme Court agreed to review two issues in Medellin:
1. In a case brought by a Mexican national whose rights were adjudicated in the
Avena Judgment, must a court in the United States apply as the rule of decision,
notwithstanding any inconsistent United States precedent, the Avena holding that
the United States courts must review and reconsider the national's conviction and
sentence, without resort to procedural default doctrines?
2. In a case brought by a foreign national of a State party to the Vienna Convention,
should a court in the United States give effect to the LaGrand and Avena Judgments
as a matter of international judicial comity and in the interest of uniform treaty
interpretation?
242
The first question, if answered in the affirmative, would impose the ICJ
judgment on U.S. courts hearing cases involving Medellin and the others
named in the Mexican complaint. This outcome would effectively nullify the
principle of procedural default in those cases. But once the cases at issue in
Avena have been subjected to review and reconsideration, no further action
with respect to Vienna Convention obligations would be required.
The second question, if affirmatively answered, could potentially affect
policy beyond the fifty-two Avena cases since the U.S. Supreme Court would
... Sources said [the accused] were bragging of the rapes and killings in their jail cells
Tuesday. All the suspects have given signed statements to police, officers said.
Police said Jennifer Lee Ertman, 14, and Elizabeth Pena, 16, were taking a shortcut to
Pena's house in the 1600 block of Lamonte from a party at the Springhill Apartments in the
4200 block of West 34th Thursday night.
The girls' path took them from the back of the complex down a trail to a railroad trestle,
where police said the suspects were hanging out and drinking beer. The girls were attacked
and dragged into the woods, police said.
A police source said the girls' clothes were tom, and the charges state both girls were
sexually assaulted. Ertman then was strangled; Pena's cause of death has not yet been
determined.
Police would not discuss the motive for the slayings, but callers from the neighborhood have
suggested everything from a gang initiation rite to an insult to a rival gang, with which one or
both of the girls was reportedly friendly.
T.J. Milling & S.K. Bardwell, Six Teens Held in Two Girls'Rape-Murders; "Vicious " Youths Reportedly
Were Bragging in Their Cells, HOUSTON CHRON., June 30, 1993, at A 1.
239. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Medellin v. Dretke, cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) (No. 04-
5928).
240. 371 F.3d at 274.
241. 125 S.Ct. 686(2004).
242. United States Supreme Court Docket for Case No. 04-5928, Medellin v. Dretke (Aug. 20,
2004), at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-5928.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
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be attempting to establish an interpretation of the Vienna Convention that is
uniform and respectful of the ICJ through comity principles. By enshrining the
Avena case in a Supreme Court decision, Avena would acquire something that
ICJ opinions alone do not possess-the status of precedent within the United
States.
Both questions speak to the Vienna Convention specifically and do not
directly address broader issues of international law in the United States.
However, two ideological opposites on the Court have indicated a willingness
to use such international sources in treaty interpretation. Justice Stephen Breyer
all but telegraphed his position on the Vienna Convention (or at least reiterated
his preference for further hearing in Breard) in a speech before the American
Society of International Law's Annual Meeting in 2003. Speaking generally in
support of the use of international and foreign law sources in U.S. litigation and
judicial decisionmaking, Breyer stated in a reference to Breard:
[A]lthough I have not seen many traditional public international law issues arise in
the course of my daily work, I know that there are issues, for example in death
penalty cases, where international treaties and decisions of international courts may
eventually prove relevant. In one recent death penalty case, the Court rejected a
treaty-based defense on procedural grounds, leaving open the possibility of such a
defense in a case where there was no procedural default. The number of treaties
relevant to domestic legal disputes seems to be rising.243
Justice Antonin Scalia, speaking before the same group the following year,
stated that he too would not be averse to citing foreign sources in interpreting
treaties:
When federal courts interpret a treaty to which the United States is party, they
should give considerable respect to the interpretation of the same treaty by the
courts of other signatories. Otherwise the whole object of the treaty, which is to
establish a singleareed-upon regime governing the actions of all the signatories,
will be frustrated.
Although Scalia spoke of the courts of other signatories, and not necessarily of
international tribunals, his sentiment does relate directly to the second issue
before the court: the need for uniformity in treaty interpretation.
Nevertheless, a favorable outcome on either Medellin question could still
leave open two obstacles to the implementation of the Vienna Convention.
Under the first Medellin question, future cases not covered by the Avena
decision may continue to turn on the issue of procedural default. An affirmative
answer to the second question would close the hole left open by the first.
However, comity and consistency of treaty interpretation are limited to subjects
that have been specifically addressed by the international tribunal, and also
presuppose the existence of a treaty in the first place. Thus, Medellin will not
243. Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 265, 267 (2003).
244. Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L. L. PROC. 305, 305 (2004).
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address the applicability of norms outside of international treaties or of other
developments in international law that may implicate the outcome of cases in
the United States. In addition, if Medellin follows Avena's focus on review and
reconsideration in light of the procedural default doctrine, it will not consider
other aspects of the consular right, or of any other right that might impact
criminal proceedings. For international law to gain further acceptance in
domestic litigation, more needs to be done.
IV. U.S. OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Medellin highlights some basic tensions between international law and
domestic law (or municipal law, as domestic law is called in the international
law discourse). Though this broad and controversial subject is largely beyond
the scope of this Article, it is important to understand the dynamic underlying
much of the maneuvering behind the Avena case, including the politics
masquerading as legal theory expounded by the Texas governor's office.
A. The Role of the ICJ in the U.S. Legal System
This Article suggests that the reception U.S. officials give to Avena has
significance beyond the subjects of consular notification and access. The notion
of international law as U.S. law derives from the constitutional status of treaties
in the United States under Article IV of the U.S. Constitution and the Supreme
Court case of The Paquete Habana,245 which declared international law to be
"part of our law." 246 The ICJ has now spoken three times on the obligations of
the United States under the Vienna Convention (including its provisional
decision in Breard), but only the Oklahoma courts have recognized the
importance of its rulings. It is time for other state and federal courts, as well as
policy makers, to acknowledge and adhere to the law as interpreted by that
international tribunal.
This is not to say that decisions of the ICJ should be treated the same way
as the precedents of domestic courts. The ICJ does not have the sort of judicial
review powers that the U.S. Supreme Court established in Marbury v.
245. 175 U.S. 677(1900).
246. Id. at 700. More specifically, the Court stated:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling
executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages
of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who
by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted
with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for
the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy
evidence of what the law really is.
Id.
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Madison.2 7 There, Chief Justice John Marshall stated, "It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.' 2 4 8 Nor is it
necessary to argue for ICJ supremacy over domestic courts akin to the
constitutionally granted supremacy of the U.S. Supreme Court over "inferior"
courts. 249 Though stare decisis-the notion that a decision determines the
outcomes of future cases-fosters predictability and stability, 25 ° it is not
sanctioned by the statute that creating the ICJ. Not only is the ICJ not obliged
to use prior decisions as mandatory precedent; it is prohibited from 
doing so.251
Furthermore, the ICJ is not, as some would claim, particularly well suited to
serve as a "supreme court" of international law.
252
Nevertheless, in the cases arising out of Avena, there is a good reason for
the federal and state authorities to follow the ICJ's ruling in Avena, and
LaGrand before it: the ICJ was the forum chosen by the United States as a
signatory of the Vienna Convention's Optional Protocol.253 By joining the
Optional Protocol, and by the Statute of the International Court of Justice itself,
parties agree to adhere to the rulings of that forum.254 The United States cannot
defeat that obligation simply by withdrawing from the Optional Protocol after
the ICJ has delivered its ruling.
Following the ICJ's decision in Avena would not require U.S. courts to
contravene settled doctrine. Though the Supreme Court has twice considered
the issue of consular notification,255 the matter has not been definitely resolved.
Although the federal and state courts were virtually of one mind in ignoring the
Vienna Convention despite admitted violations of the treaty, they have used
several different theories to justify rendering the Vienna Convention ineffective
within U.S. borders. 256 By contrast, the ICJ has now delivered clear judgments
on consular notification on two separate occasions, 257 and the United States has
either explicitly or implicitly accepted its obligation to adhere to both
decisions.
258
247. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
248. Id. at 177.
249. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
250. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (192 1).
251. Statute of the international Court of Justice, supra note 194, art. 59.
252. See M.N.S. Sellers, The Authority of the International Court of Justice, 8 INT'L LEGAL
THEORY 41 (2002).
253. See infra Section V.B.
254. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 194, art. 59 (stating that a decision
by the court is binding upon the parties before it).
255. See Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999); Breard v. Greene,
523 U.S. 371 (1998).
256. See supra Part III.
257. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. I (Mar. 31); LaGrand (F.R.G.
v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
258. In its brief in Avena, the United States acknowledged its obligation to abide by the ICJ's ruling
in LaGrand. Counter-Memorial of the United States of America, supra note 207, at 61-64 (Chapter V).
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B. Beyond the ICJ-International Legal Development in U.S. Law
While the Medellin case focuses on the ICJ's approach to consular access,
international law development does not rest on tribunal decisions alone.
International law is also created outside of specific court decisions. Its
development relies upon other sources to establish general legal norms,
including customary law and codification through multilateral treaties. The
Statute of the International Court of Justice outlines the array of sources from
which international law is determined:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
259
Because international law is the law of the United States, these sources should
help inform decisions involving international matters in U.S. courts.
This broader proposition is controversial. It would call for the wholesale
incorporation of international law principles into U.S. law, something is a
frightening thought to many people. But nation-states do have some protection
under international law against such an onslaught. Based upon the principle of
international sovereignty, states may opt out of customary international law
development by consistent objection to a particular principle.260 And certainly,
a state always has the option of not entering into a treaty that might bind its
behavior in the future.
If these safeguards are thought to be insufficient, and if resistance to
incorporating international law norms into U.S. law continues, then the
language of the Court in The Paquete Habana may ring hollow. Should
international legal norms involving human rights, criminal justice, and the like
be applicable to U.S. cases? The Medellin approach, of taking narrow and
specific issues framed for a particular case, cannot resolve that more general
question, but perhaps no single case should. Nevertheless, it remains important
to reflect upon the place of international law in the resolution of domestic
cases.
As noted supra Subsection III.B.3, letters from the Legal Advisor of the Department of State to the
Governor of Oklahoma and to the chair of that state's Board of Pardon and Parole strongly suggested
that Oklahoma seriously consider the ICJ position in a death penalty matter involving a Mexican
national.
259. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 194, art. 38.
260. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S § 102 cmt. b (1987)
("A principle of customary law is not binding on a state that declares its dissent from the principle
during its development.").
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V. INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM
The opinions of the ICJ in LaGrand and Avena both refer to the actions of
states within the United States as acts of the United States itself.261 In LaGrand,
the failure of the Governor of Arizona to prevent the execution of Walter
LaGrand following the ICJ's order for provisional measures was surely as
problematic as the federal government's lukewarm recommendation to the
governor. 262 The fact that the United States is a federal union did not forestall
the ICJ from finding the United States liable for what were primarily state
violations of the Vienna Convention in both Avena and LaGrand. There is little
question that the United States itself is bound both to the Vienna Convention
and the Statute of the International Court of Justice.263 Moreover, neither Texas
261. In LaGrand, the ICJ noted that "the fact that the United States repeated in all phases of these
proceedings that it is carrying out a vast and detailed programme in order to ensure compliance by its
competent authorities at the federal as well as at the state and local levels with its obligation under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention." LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 512 (June 27)
(emphasis added). Indeed, inasmuch as both cases involved state law enforcement procedures and not
federal law enforcement procedures, there can be no doubt that the actions of the states were attributable
to the United States.
262. A stronger view is that the ICJ implicated the Governor of Arizona directly in its provisional
order in LaGrand. Consider the following language in its order:
28. Whereas the international responsibility of a State is engaged by the action of the
competent organs and authorities acting in that State, whatever they may be; whereas the
United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not
executed pending the final decision in these proceedings; whereas, according to the
information available to the Court, implementation of the measures indicated in the present
Order falls within the jurisdiction of the Governor of Arizona; whereas the Government of the
United States is consequently under the obligation to transmit the present Order to the said
Governor; whereas the Governor of Arizona is under the obligation to act in conformity with
the international undertakings of the United States ....
LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 16 (Order of Mar. 3 on Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures) (emphasis added); see also Ward Ferdinandusse, Out of the Black-Box? The
International Obligations of State Organs, 29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 45, 66-71 (2003).
Under this view, the ICJ is asserting that Arizona has a direct obligation to act in conformity with
international undertakings of the United States. Though this is a plausible view, it is not preferred.
Instead, the ICJ is simply recognizing the basic federal structure of the United States. In Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), the U.S. Supreme Court determined that international obligation of the
federal government are binding within the states.
263. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, requires
states to abide by their treaty obligations and prohibits reliance on internal laws as an excuse for breach.
Accordingly, a federal state may not invoke its federal system and the division of authority among the
national and sub-national governments as a reason for non-compliance. As stated in the Draft Articles on
State Responsibility:
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international
law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions,
whatever position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an
organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the State.
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal
law of the State.
Draft Articles on Responsibilities of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 4, in Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp.
No. 10, at 43, 44, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/
Stateresponsibility/responsibility articles(e).pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
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nor its forty-nine sister states are recognized apart from the United States in
international law.
264
A related question is whether Texas has an obligation to abide by
international law within the context of international society. Since Texas
arguably has little identity under international law, the state has no concomitant
obligations outside of its place within the federal union. However, as a member
of the United States, Texas does have obligations, limitations, and
responsibilities under the U.S. Constitution. Texas must also concern itself with
justiciability issues, specifically whether a treaty is regarded as self-executing
within the United States. In light of these considerations, the claim that the
ICJ's decision in Avena has no impact on Texas is simply untenable.
A. Powers Reserved to the States Under the Tenth Amendment
The obligation of the several states of the union to abide by the federal
government's international law obligations is a matter of national constitutional
law. In the present case, state and federal courts would be required to respond
to an individual's Vienna Convention claim only if the treaty is regarded as
self-executing. In other words, is a particular treaty the source of rights
cognizable in domestic courts?265 Since its ratification, the State Department
264. Questions have arisen regarding whether parties other than sovereign states can conclude
international treaties. In the context of the Vienna Convention, an apparently tongue-in-cheek remark by
Alberto Gonzales, then the legal advisor to Texas Governor George W. Bush, raised the issue. Gonzales
stated in a letter to the U.S. State Department regarding a pending execution: "Since the State of Texas
is not a signatory to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, we believe it is inappropriate to ask
Texas to determine whether a breach.. . occurred in connection with the arrest and conviction." See
Alan Berlow, Lone Star Justice, SLATE.COM, at http://slate.msn.com/id/2102416 (June 15, 2004).
The international law answer would seem to be that in certain limited circumstances, federated
entities might conceivably conclude treaties. For example, Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, supra note 263, states that it is possible for subjects other than states to conclude
treaties. However, those "other subjects of international law" to which the treaty makes reference may
be limited to international organizations given that the ICJ's earliest definition of that term dealt with a
case involving the status of the United Nations. 1949 I.C.J. 182 See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in
the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 182 (Apr. 11). For an alternative view, see JAN WOUTERS
& LEEN DE SMET, THE LEGAL POSITION OF FEDERAL STATES AND THEIR FEDERATED ENTITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-THE CASE OF BELGIUM 5 (Inst. for Int'l Law, Working Paper No. 7,
2001), available at http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/iir/eng/wp/VP7e.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2005).
This is not to say that federated entities cannot enter into arrangements or compacts with foreign
entities. The validity of such agreements might ultimately rest on the vagaries of municipal law. In the
United States, the Compact Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, as interpreted in the Supreme Court
case of Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893), would allow Congress to scrutinize such compacts
on the basis of their effect on the just supremacy of the United States.
265. The Constitution declares that treaties are part of the law of the land. U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2. The language would indicate that treaties are, immediately upon ratification, part of the corpus of
laws that can create obligations within the United States. The term "self-executing" implies as much.
Chief Justice John Marshall clarified the matter, however, by implying what Professor Louis Henkin
calls an exception to the constitutional principle. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 199 (2d ed. 1996). Chief Justice Marshall laid out his constitutional theory of treaty
effectiveness in Foster v. Neilson:
Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded
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has regarded the Vienna Convention as self-executing.
266
One of the longstanding debates within U.S. constitutional law involves the
sharing of power between the states and the national government. The debate
stems from the Tenth Amendment, which declares, "The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 267 The passage seems
straightforward enough, except for the fact that the scope of the delegated
powers is contested. The listed powers of the legislative and executive branches
are subject to implied powers that allow legislation and rulemaking for the
268purpose of implementing those listed powers. For two centuries, the U.S.
Supreme Court has grappled with the scope of federal power to implement the
delegated powers, and this remains the most intractable controversy in
constitutional law. As a result, the scope of federal power is difficult to
determine and is frequently subject to speculation.
Moreover, the Avena decision implicates the general police power of the
states to protect the citizenry from criminal behavior. This power is not
enumerated as a power of the federal government under the Constitution and,
accordingly, is "reserved to the States." Each state has the power to enforce its
laws against threats to property and persons through incarceration, and, in the
case of capital murder, through execution. Federal activity in the area of law
enforcement is limited to Congress's implied powers. However, the states'
police powers come into question where they intersect with an international
treaty or are a matter of interest to U.S. foreign policy. The Supreme Court's
decision in the landmark case of Missouri v. Holland 269 helped settle the
confusion that arose when international obligations implicated domestic
activities.
in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself
without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a
contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses
itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract
before it can become a rule for the Court.
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). Marshall thus describes two situations: treaties that automatically
become rule of law, and treaties requiring further action on the part of Congress (beyond Senate
ratification) before they become effective. The implementation process assures that the dictates of the
treaty do not conflict with existing U.S. laws and regulations. Henkin calls this the exception to the
notion that treaties are by nature the law of the land, as it is possible that a treaty may not be
implemented due to an impasse between the executive and legislative branches. HENKIN, supra, at 199..
Importantly, however, in the present case, the Vienna Convention is regarded as self-executing; thus,
there is no need for further congressional action. However, this confusing concept helps account for the
ease by which Texas state officials can disregard the Vienna Convention and the dictates of the ICJ.
266. The State Department acknowledged as much in testimony before the Senate during
ratification hearings. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 91-9, app. at 2, 5 (1969) (statement of J. Edward Lyerly,
Deputy Legal Adviser to the Department of State).
267. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
268. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
269. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
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Holland involved a treaty between the United States and the United
Kingdom dealing with migratory birds flying between the United States and
Canada. The treaty, implemented by federal legislation, restricted the hunting
of certain birds, a prohibition that came into conflict with Missouri law, over
whose territory some of the birds traveled. Missouri challenged the
congressional legislation. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the 7-2
majority, characterized legislation implementing treaties as superior to state
laws and powers inasmuch as treaty law is the supreme law of the land. Of
course, congressional legislation dealing solely with domestic matters is also
the supreme law of the land, but it is nevertheless subject to scrutiny as to
whether it infringes on state powers. 27 Holmes, however, portrayed the treaty
power and implementing legislation as being about something more. 271 He
described legislation implementing treaties as based upon treaties that were
made under the constitutional authority of the United States. The import of that
reasoning is that where a treaty is ratified under constitutional procedure, the
substantive aspects of a treaty, and its implementing legislation, need not pass
constitutional muster. It was subsequently determined in Reid v. Covert that
what Holmes meant to say was that implementing legislation need not pass
Tenth Amendment muster; Holland, as had been feared for decades, did not
provide a wholesale immunization of treaties and implementing legislation
272from constitutional scrutiny.
B. The Federal Government's Authority over Texas in Avena
The state of Texas, as a result of the constitutional architecture that places
federal international obligations above the states' reserved powers, is bound by
the Vienna Convention, a treaty signed and ratified by the United States. The
dictates of the Convention, however, are partly the result of litigation and the
interpretation by the ICJ. Conceivably, Texas could claim that it acknowledges
its obligations under the Vienna Convention itself, but that the ICJ does not
have the authority to enforce its interpretation on the Lone Star State. 273 Such a
possibility, however, is addressed in the Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes, a part of the Vienna Convention. The United States signed both the
270. In Chief Justice Marshall's words: "Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt
measures which are prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become
the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such
an act was not the law of the land." McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
271. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390,
434-45 (1998). For reasons discussed in Section V.C, Professor Bradley may not have fully considered
the distinction between the two powers in the Constitution having to do with the sourcing "authority."
272. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1956) (plurality opinion of Black, J.).
273. In fact, this appears to be Texas's argument at present.
Vol. 23:455, 2005
Avena and the World Court
Convention and the Optional Protocol, and the Protocol specifically authorizes
the final settlement of disputes regarding treaty matters by the ICJ.
274
The same constitutional reasoning applicable to the substantive part of the
Vienna Convention applies to the Optional Protocol. Because of the supremacy
of the treaty to any of the police powers that Texas may claim, the state is
bound by the ICJ judgment in the Avena case. The recent decision of the
federal government to withdraw from the Optional Protocol does not alter this
reality. The ICJ delivered the Avena decision at a time when the United States
was obliged to follow its edicts. While the United States may no longer be
required to adhere to future ICJ judgments, the fifty-two cases at issue in Avena
must still be handled in accordance with the ruling of the ICJ. The federal
government appears to recognize as much, since it directed the states to provide
full review and reconsideration of those cases.
275
Ultimately, the question of whether Texas must follow Avena revolves
around whether a constitutional principle announced eighty-five years ago in
Holland still has resonance in what could be a particularly contentious test of
wills between the federal government and the states. At the heart of the dispute
are two basic issues: first, whether implementing legislation is required to
enforce the Vienna Convention and/or the judgment of the ICJ, and, second,
whether the federalist structure could withstand federal intervention in what is
perhaps the most basic of state functions, law enforcement.
C. Implementing Legislation and the Enforcement of Self-Executing Treaties
Missouri v. Holland dealt with a treaty that was not self-executing and thus
required implementing legislation. The Court ruled that legislation pursuant to
a treaty is not bound by the limits of the Tenth Amendment. The Vienna
Convention, by contrast has been acknowledged to be a self-executing treaty.
276
Certainly, the fact that the Convention is a self-executing treaty makes an even
stronger case for moving beyond federal and state rivalries. As one authority
notes generally on the subject of self-executing treaties:
By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, treaties of their own force nullify inconsistent
state laws and earlier federal laws, and the judicial mechanisms available generally
to enforce laws in the United States are available to enforce treaties.
27 7
274. Article I of the Optional Protocol provides:
Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought
before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the
present Protocol.
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. 325, 326, 596 U.N.T.S. 487,488.
275. See supra notes 9-10, 21 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 266.
277. Carlos Manuel Vasquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
695,700 (1995).
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Other commentators have invoked the Supremacy Clause when addressing the
authority of treaties over state legislation.
278
Several of the leading treaty cases do not rest the supremacy of treaty law
on the existence of implementing legislation, whether or not an agreement is
self-executing. United States v. Belmont,279 for example, considered a federal
policy that was embodied in neither a treaty nor congressional legislation. In
that case, an executive agreement sought to address claims arising from the
nationalization of private property by the new government of the Soviet Union.
The state of New York had a policy against the nationalization of assets in the
state and supported withholding sums from the settlement process. New York's
policy was found to conflict with the U.S. policy embodied in what was known
as the "Litvinov Assignment" of Soviet nationalized assets to the United States
for orderly disbursement among American claimants. Ruling in favor of the
United States, the Supreme Court stated that "the external policies of the
United States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies."
280
This holding was further reiterated several years later under virtually the same
circumstances in United States v. Pink,28' which also involved New York
financial policy in light of the same Litvinov Assignments.
Elsewhere, in Zschernig v. Miller,282 the Court found a state inheritance law
that effectively discriminated against legatees of communist countries to
interfere with U.S. foreign policy. The state law in Zschernig did not conflict
with a specific legislative or executive statement of federal policy as was the
case in Belmont. Together, Belmont and Zschernig provide clear examples of
the breadth of the federal government's role in foreign affairs-a role
cognizable with or without treaties and with or without implementing
legislation.283
The Supreme Court has held fast to the notion of federal supremacy in
matters of foreign affairs, whether through the Supremacy Clause or through
the treaty power. Claims that Holland is an old case with limited significance
today ignore the Court's recent reaffirmation of the Holland principle in United
States v. Lara,284 where the Court recognized that "treaties made pursuant to
that power can authorize Congress to deal with 'matters' with which otherwise
'Congress could not deal."'
285
Of course, the Court's willingness to uphold federal authority vis-a-vis the
278. HENKIN, supra note 265, at 156-65.
279. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
280. Id. at 331.
281. 315 U.S. 203, 217 (1941).
282. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
283. See Louis Henkin, Provisional Measures, U.S. Treaty Obligations, and the States, 92 AM. J.
INT'L L. 679, 680-81 (1997).
284. 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
285. Id. at 201 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)).
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states in matters of foreign policy does not mean that existing doctrine cannot
be read narrowly to limit its applicability in other situations. The question
becomes whether all categories of state action can or should be subsumed under
the federal government's foreign policy interests where state policy and federal
foreign policy conflict. The interference in Zschernig and, conceivably, in
Belmont and Pink could be characterized as overt: Oregon's probate laws were
designed to disapprove of communism during the Cold War and New York's
financial policies likely served the same purpose during the early days of the
Soviet Union.
The issue of Texas's compliance with the ICJ's Avena decision is of a
different character. The state's criminal justice system is insular; it does not
criticize another regime, or attempt to exert influence in foreign affairs. Foreign
affairs may have thrust upon Texas an obligation to provide consular notice and
information, an obligation that it refused to acknowledge in the cases at issue in
Avena. But the state's behavior was rooted in laws and procedures that it
adopted without regard to foreign policy. The motives of state officials who
chose not to provide the required review and reconsideration is up for
speculation. However, a plausible argument can be made that their decision
merely followed the state's standard criminal justice procedures. As such, it
does not necessarily represent a commentary on a foreign system or an attempt
to insert the state into international relations in the same manner as the state
actions at issue in Zschernig, Belmont, and Pink.
Missouri v. Holland would appear to address this argument, given that a
Missouri law for the regulation of bird hunting is not itself an attempt to thrust
the state of Missouri into international affairs, though, according to Justice
Holmes, the effect was to do just that. But in Holland, the U.S.-UK treaty
covered the precise subject of the state law, and the state law directly clashed
with the treaty, essentially making it a matter of conflict preemption.286 In the
sixteen Texas cases at issue in Avena, the state's criminal laws do not
necessarily conflict with U.S. policy on the issue of consular notification,
though Texas's enforcement of those laws might. However, the state's failure
to conform to the Vienna Convention and abide by the ICJ's ruling is an act of
omission, not an express conflict or an overt policy. Nor does established
precedent rely upon a device like the Optional Protocol of the Vienna
Convention, which is merely a jurisdictional agreement giving the ICJ authority
to settle disputes under the treaty. Thus, the question becomes: is this an
appropriate area for the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution to "trump" the
286. See United States v. Samples, 258 F. 479 (W.D. Mo. 1919), affd sub nom. Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The case involved an arrest of two hunters in Missouri by a federal game
warden for killing certain birds in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918, 40 Stat.
755. Apparently, the hunting would not have violated Missouri law, and the hunters challenged the
federal legislation while the state of Missouri sought to restrain enforcement of the law in Missouri.
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Tenth Amendment, or is the business of trumping reserved for special cases?
There are two views on this question. One is that the scope of the Tenth
Amendment has already been narrowed as much as it can be when it comes to
foreign policy. A second view the Tenth Amendment is irrelevant in
determining the legitimacy of treaties and implementing legislation under the
constitutional scheme.
1. Tenth Amendment as a Limitation on the Treaty Power
One could argue that the current trend of the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence toward a revival of pre-New Deal federalism may have
undermined some of the authority of the Holland decision. Whether the
Supreme Court goes quite that far is sport for Court watchers. However, the
Court in Holland does describe a radical notion of federal power, in which the
treaty power is not subject to any limitations, save for limitations regarding
individual liberties as announced in Reid.287 Critics contend that the treaty
power (and legislation implementing it) should be subject to the same Tenth
Amendment limitations as other congressional legislation pursuant to the
enumerated powers of Congress under Article 1.288
If legislation adopted under the treaty power was treated like other
legislation, the treaty power itself would be restricted. In the Commerce Clause
cases, which involve direct Tenth Amendment tensions, the Supreme Court has
reduced the scope of permissible federal legislation. Instead of a catch-all
power for Congress to engage in social legislation premised upon the economic
impact of social, the Court under Chief Justice William Rehnquist has
narrowed the commerce power to one that authorizes legislation in commercial
289and economic subject matters. If the Commerce Clause cases offer the right
analogy, it is conceivable that a reconstituted approach to the treaty power
would narrow its scope to traditional matters of international affairs, as opposed
to matters that affect international affairs in some way. 29 Even in Holland,
287. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
288. Bradley, supra note 271, at 434-35, 456-61.
289. In the two major cases signaling a sea-change in the Court's interpretation of the Commerce
Clause, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000), the Supreme Court dealt with Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. The question in
each case was whether Congress had the power to regulate an activity simply based upon the fact that
the activity had some effect on commerce, whether or not the activity regulated was commercial. Lopez
dealt with a national law prohibiting handguns near schools (a subject normally covered by state
criminal laws), and Morrison considered a national law giving women the right to sue abusers and
rapists in federal court. Because both areas of regulation (illicit travel with firearms and abuse of
women) affected economic activity, four members of the court felt that it was an appropriate area of
national legislation. However, the Court held otherwise, arguing that the activity regulated had to be
itself a subject of commercial activity.
290. The fear has always been that the federal government would find some compliant nation-state
and conclude a treaty covering matters not "traditionally international" so that Congress could enact
implementing legislation that might be otherwise prohibited by constitutional limitations such as the
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Justice Holmes did seem to operate under the assumption that the treaty power
might be limited by some subject-matter restrictions: "Here a national interest
of very nearly the first magnitude is involved. It can be protected only by
national action in concert with that of another power. The subject-matter
[migratory birds] is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent
habitat therein.
' 291
On the other hand, Holmes did state that the treaty power was different
from other powers of the federal government in that the power to conclude
treaties came under the authority of the United States, whereas "[a]cts of
Congress are the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the
Constitution." 292 Justice Black's plurality opinion in Reid v. Covert,
293 in
clarifying (or modifying) Holmes' holding, appeared to question the crucial
rationale for this extraordinary authority granted by the Treaty Clause. Black
argued that the exclusive language regarding the source of the authority of the
treaty power--"under the authority of the United States"-was meant to ensure
that treaties entered into during the period of the Articles of Confederation
would remain in force after the new Constitution went 
into effect.294
Nevertheless, the central holding of Holland remained intact despite the
possibility that its textual rationale may have been weakened.
295 Under both the
Holmes and Black formulations, the permissible subject matter for treaties
appears to have been understood liberally, and the precise limits of the treaty
296
power remain vague.
2. The Tenth Amendment Does Not Matter in Determining the Breadth of
the Treaty Power
Professor Louis Henkin has argued for the supremacy of federal foreign
relations policy over state interests. His view is essentially that valid federal
Tenth Amendment.
291. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920).
292. Id. at 433.
293. 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
294. Id. at 16-17.
295. Justice Black's argument regarding the language of Article VI ("Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States .... ) does not mean that Holmes was wrong. The
phrase, "or which shall be made," also covers treaties entered into following the adoption of the
Constitution. The language does not preclude limitations on the Treaty Power, "but they must be
ascertained a different way" from the Tenth Amendment's restrictions on legislation. Holland, 252 U.S.
at 433. Limitations on the treaty power would rely on structural considerations-considerations having
to do with governance generally: "matters requiring national action, 'a power which must belong to and
somewhere reside in every civilized government.' Id. (quoting Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33
(1903)).
296. See Bradley, supra note 271, at 453. Bradley notes that as international law develops,
traditional notions of what is "international" continue to fall. Even notions of working in concert with
other nations does not exclude purely domestic interests, such as human rights, from having
international significance.
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expressions of foreign policy include those that interfere with states rights.297 In
other words, the legitimacy of a federal action, be it a treaty, an implementing
statute, or an executive agreement, does not depend on the relationship of the
subject matter to state concerns. 298 Henkin argues that the nation's entire
foreign policy apparatus, the judicial doctrine on the subject, and the text of the
Constitution all point in that direction.
299
Furthermore, despite a revival of federalist concerns in recent Supreme
Court opinions, Henkin claims that there are "no hints of any [invisible]
radiations" that would warrant state non-compliance with treaty obligations.3 °°
Henkin is an absolutist on the issue of federalism: when it comes to matters of
foreign policy, the federal government's interest should always prevail. Henkin
found this to be particularly true with regard to the provisional measures issued
by the ICJ in Paraguay v. U.S.30 However, his view is not totally consonant
with Holmes' attempt to place some limits on this treaty power with the
vaguely defined subject-matter distinction.
Neither the Holmes nor Henkin position excuse Texas's obligation to
adhere to the Vienna Convention as interpreted in Avena. The Texas cases at
issue in Avena involve foreign nationals and foreign offices operating within
the borders of the state. It is hard to imagine something more international than
that. Even if the constitutional validity of treaties rests on an international
subject matter (whatever that is), the cases in Texas involve an international
agreement-the Vienna Convention-that addresses a traditional subject of
international cooperation-the treatment of foreign diplomats. There can be no
doubt that the United States, if it chose to, could seek a court order requiring
Texas and its sister states, to comply with the decision of the ICJ. 30 2 Under U.S.
297. See Henkin, supra note 283, at 679-82.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 682. Henkin's use of the term "radiations" is an apparent allusion to New York v. United
States, 506 U.S. 144 1992), which involved a dispute over whether the Congress could require New
York to enact legislation furthering federal toxic waste policy pursuant to the Commerce Power. The
Supreme Court stated:
No matter how powerful the federal interest involved, the Constitution simply does not give
Congress the authority to require the States to regulate. The Constitution instead gives
Congress the authority to regulate matters directly and to pre-empt contrary state regulation.
Id. at 178. The case is seen as a limitation on Congressional power "no matter how powerful the federal
interest involved." This is likely the source of Henkin's "radiations" remark: It refers to the likelihood
that even important federal foreign policy interests could be subsumed to state power if the "radiations"
of New York seeped into the foreign relations power.
301. Henkin, supra note 283, at 679-81.
302. The United States, in its brief in Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), took a different view:
But in any event, the "measures at [the government's] disposal" are a matter of domestic
United States law, and our federal system imposes limits on the federal government's ability
to interfere with the criminal justice systems of the States. The "measures at [the United
States'] disposal" under our Constitution may in some cases include only persuasion-such as
the Secretary of State's request to the Governor of Virginia to stay Breard's execution-and
not legal compulsion through the judicial system. That is the situation here. Accordingly, the
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case law, the federal government would win. It is only a matter of political will.
It is difficult to make a legal argument for the intransigence of the state of
Texas with regard to the ICJ. Neither international law nor constitutional law
supports such an absolute refusal. Indeed, as Henkin characterizes the
Zschernig decision, "[T]he states are bound to refrain from interfering in U.S.
foreign affairs even if the executive branch has not asked the states to do so,
has not taken any formal action." 303 And the treaty power, even under a
restrictive interpretation of existing case law, would support federal action
against Texas under the present circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The failure of Texas to comply with the Vienna Convention is only the
latest in a long line of controversies surrounding the state's administration of its
historically problematic and highly criticized capital punishment system. Both
domestic and international law clearly demonstrate that Texas must comply
with the Avena decision. Actual compliance with Avena's requirements-
providing meaningful "review and reconsideration"-is neither onerous nor
burdensome. Indeed, neither is general compliance with the Vienna Convention
itself. As such, non-compliance is not only in violation of domestic and
international law, but it is also without sound public policy justifications. In
light of the fact that Mexico and Mexican citizens take the issue of the death
penalty extremely seriously, and given that Texas wants Mexico to comply
with its international treaty obligations, Texas needs to be sensitive to its
neighbor to the south and comply with Avena and the requirements of the
Vienna Convention. Meaningful "review and reconsideration" as mandated by
Avena should and must be provided to the sixteen Mexican citizens currently
on Texas's death row. As astutely noted by Richard Dieter, director of the
Death Penalty Information Center, the ICJ has limited reach and limited powers
to enforce its own order: "They've got no army, they've got no police. There's
no way (the order) will be enforced except by international pressure and
pride." 3°4 We hope this Article will serve as the first of many such pressures.
ICJ's order does not provide an independent basis for this Court either to grant certiorari or to
stay the execution.
Brief for Appellee at 51, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-1390).
303. Henkin, supra note 283, at 682.
304. Schiller & Robbins, supra note 5 (quoting Richard Dieter).

